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I The September
11 attacks and the ensuing "war against terror" have opened
up a new situation worldwide. We are witnessing an increased aggressiveness
and warmongering on the part of imperialism; new alignments among
the big powers and also between them and the semi-colonial countries,
a systemic crisis of the world economy and also increased class polarization
and tension.
II THE BREAK
DOWN OF THE 90S UNSTABLE EQUILIRIUM
The present situation means the unstable equilibrium of the 90s has
broken down. During that period, the US regained -to a certain extent-
their hegemonic position with regards to rival imperialist powers
and expanded their political and economic rule over both peripheral
countries and the so-called "second periphery", as shown
by the inroads of capitalist restoration in Eastern Europe, the former
USSR and China -in a drive that also involved their Japanese and European
counterparts. The demise of the USSR gave the US an enhanced room
for manoeuvre that allowed expanding the frontiers of capital to new
geographical regions and also deepening the neoliberal offensive all
around the world- the so-called "globalisation".
However, if during the early 90s there was the illusion of a "harmonious
and peaceful" expansion of their rule, a whole series of contradictions
and antagonistic forces surfaced in the last few years of the last
century, which dissipated such illusions. These forces at work are:
the 1997 South East Asian slump and the ensuing crisis in the so-called
"emerging markets" that plunged most of the countries in
the periphery into a deep crisis; the emergence and development of
the anti-capitalist movement in the imperialist heartlands after the
"battle of Seattle" in late 1999; the failure of the neoliberal
agenda in Latin America and the resistance that went hand in hand
with it and grew apace in the year 2000; the outburst of a second
Intifada in Palestine in September 2000 and the increasing anti-American
mood in the Middle East and throughout the Islamic world; the rejection
by both the Russian and the Chinese bureaucracies and also the European
imperialist governments to the Bush administration in his first six
months in office; the end of the American "boom" that has
dragged the whole world economy into recession.
Given this situation, the September 11 attacks have fuelled and sped
up the developments in the world situation, pointing to a break down
in the unstable equilibrium of the last decade.
III HISTORICAL
VULNERABILITY, INCREASED INTERVENTIONISM AND WARMONGERING
The September
11 attacks exposed the increased historical vulnerability of the US.
The growing economic, political and military domination of the peoples
of the world by imperialism has brought an increased intermingling
of the contradictions and the turmoil in our planet with US capital,
eroding its foundations.
A most telling proof of this has been the failure of imperialism in
preventing the flare-up of regional conflicts or else civil wars in
zones or states far away from its territory from affecting its security
at home (e.g., Afghanistan).
That is why, all things considered, the demise of the Stalinist apparatus
worldwide has ultimately increased its historical vulnerability.
The collaboration of Stalinism when it came to pinning down the working
class and the national liberation movements was a key leverage to
keep the status quo in the wake of the Second World War. The loss
of such counter-revolutionary ally-adversary means the US shall deal
alone with all the contradictions at work in the world arena, which
means it is increasingly exposed to the blows coming from the "hotspots"
of the planet.
Isolationism, which could have been a valid option at the time of
their rise to world power, has now -given the present circumstances-,
become not only inadequate but even unthinkable for the US due to
their massive commitments abroad. The turn in Bush's foreign policy
speaks volumes about this. No matter he was preparing for a "retreat"
in the early days of his presidency with the aim of focusing on those
spots deemed vital for their national interest, Bush has now become
the standard-bearer of a "new interventionism": the presence
of the US army is probably now at its peak ever since the end of the
Second World War, spreading its tentacles in more than 140 countries.
IV US imperialism
has responded to this unprecedented situation by a display of aggressiveness
both at home and abroad, with the purpose of rebuilding its façade
as an imperial power. By resorting to their overwhelming military
muscle, they try to make a bold display of force in order to keep
instability at bay and also go for a tightened surveillance at home
and a new international security system. Will US imperialism be able
to succeed in its undertakings in the period ahead? Or else, will
they fail to match their military supremacy with an according political
might? The answer we give to such questions has to do with the likelihood
of the US making further progress to rule the world, thus prolonging
their hegemony, or else -should they fail to do so- a quantum leap
in their historical decline that commenced in the early 70s.
V A RENEWED
UNILATERALISM RELIANT ON FORCE AND THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE IMPERIALIST
STATE
In pursuit of
their most precious purpose, i.e. the consolidation of their rule,
the US have resorted to the huge political and military resources
they have at hand, thus overriding all the obstacles standing in their
way. This supreme aim presides over the other aspects of their war
against terror: the reservations posed by the international alliance
backing them, the reluctance of the Muslim countries in the sphere
of foreign policy, or else the constitutional guarantees for the democratic
rights and the scope of the state power at home. Such is the actual
content of the "Bush doctrine": a massive concentration
of power in the hands of the presidency to go for a renewed "unilateralism"
on the world arena. The way the war was led bears testimony to this:
exclusively Washington, without any consultation whatsoever, took
all the major political and military decisions, even on the level
of tactics. On top of this comes the US denunciation of the ABM Treaty
in order to beef up its polemic national defense space shield, in
late 2001. The White House has recently unveiled plans to store, not
destroy, more than 4000 nuclear warheads that should have been destroyed
under the auspices of the disarmament treaties signed by Russia and
the US. Such decision, which is intent upon reassuring a strategic
supremacy for the US in the long term, has meant a snub to their most
fervent ally in the war against terror: the government of Putin. They
have thus stripped Russia off any vestige of its superpower status.
In the present situation, the "multilateralism" that came
after September 11 is nothing but a cover-up for this agenda, or more
precisely a "multilateralism a la carte" -as some commentators
brand it.
VI The
central role played by the imperialist state, both when it came to
leading the war as well as in the face of the recession; above all
when it came to restoring the investors' confidence in the invincibility
and solidity of the imperial power gives the lie to the think-tanks
of the anti-globalisation movement, who claimed there is an "autonomy
of multinational corporations" (MNC). The ongoing war against
terror sponsored by Washington highlights that, regardless of the
increased integration of the world economy in the last decades, such
change has not eaten away the sovereignty of the nation-state, transferring
it into the hands of a "supranational" entity -a postulate
of those holding the view of a "Empire" or a post-imperialist
world.
The main thrust of the US actions -never mind they are wrapped up
in the robes of the defence of universal values ("infinite justice"/
"long-lasting freedom")- is to pursue their own national
interest and to consolidate their domination. This is what shapes
the aims and the means for the military operations. The US did not
even bother this time to resort to the umbrella of the UN, as in the
Gulf War back in 1991, or else that of their NATO allies, such as
in the 1999 War against Yugoslavia. Although both the UN and NATO
voted and passed resolutions supporting the general aims of the war
against terror, both have been left behind when it came to the politico-military
purposes of the retaliation drive.
VII The
concepts of leadership/hegemony on one hand, and domination/coercion
on the other can be applied to appraise the forms of the US supremacy
and the way in which it is exerted. This comes and goes down to alternative
paths. The first path is the one used in their links with their closest
allies -NATO and Japan. The second path is the one used in the links
of Washington with the periphery, in which the ratio of consensus/coercion
is hinged upon both economic relevance of, and also the strategic
interest in any given allied or client state.
Although the crusade against terror has enabled Washington to enhance
its hegemony over the rival big powers, this relies, in the main,
in a discretional use of force. This determines the nature of the
anti-terror coalition now backing and giving legitimacy to Washington's
agenda. In this respect, the alliance of big powers behind them is
different from the anti-communist alliance that Washington led during
the so-called "cold war". Back then, its unrivalled hegemony
empowered them to preside over a bloc made up of the Western powers
and Japan, which rallied behind its aims, while it ruled on the nations
of the semicolonial periphery -in the wider framework of mutual influence
and propaganda between a US-led capitalist world and the Moscow-led
"socialist" bloc. Today, with the "cold war" long
gone, the US is not in a position to gain an unconditional acceptation
of the rival powers to their diktats, which means that the consensus/coercion
ratio will shift to increasing levels of coercion.
With regards to the semicolonial countries, the rule exerted by Washington
has become stronger. Bush's ultimatum -"either you are with us
or with the terrorists"- has narrowed the room for manoeuvre
for this countries, forcing them into an almost total support for
the US if they do not want to call forth a diplomatic and/or military
retaliation. The US are today resorting to a political, diplomatic,
economic and (in some cases) even military blackmail or extortion
to wrestle support from the oil-producing countries in the Gulf, Egypt,
Turkey and even countries like Argentina -in stark contrast to what
happened with the coalition against Irak, when such countries enthusiastically
collaborated with the US. Back in 1991, the downfall of the USSR meant
that Washington could cover up its rule with a relative dose of consensus,
which was codified in the "Washington Consensus" espoused
by most peripheral countries. Today, the aggravation of the social
and economic situation in the wake of the increased imperialist take-over
of the periphery in the last decades, makes the alignment with Washington
will come by as a by-product of pressure, rather than being considered
a strategic option in itself.
THE INCREASED
AMERICAN RULE IS THE MAIN SOURCE OF TENSIONS WORLWIDE
VIII In
the short term, Washington's influence over the various countries
in the world has been enhanced. Nevertheless, this enhanced US rule
is the main source, in the medium term, of massive tensions building
up within the international state system, which might burst into the
open as a result of any sudden turn-about of both political and military
developments. On a more strategic level, such tensions stem from the
uncontestable division of the world in three imperialist economic
blocs with a relatively equal power. This, at a time when the process
of capitalist restoration in the old "communist giants"
has not transformed them into full-blown semi-colonies -notwithstanding
the major inroads of capitalism there. On top of these we should add
the unheard-of exacerbation of combined and uneven development in
the semicolonial countries provoked by the neo-colonial drive there.
These systemic conditions account for the historical inadequacy of
every attempt by Washington at turning its regained hegemony -which
all in all is a defensive response to the September 11 attacks- into
an offensive line aimed at establishing a new order tailor-made for
the US -what some analysts call a "hyperpower".
IX From
here flows a tension running through the strategic orientation of
the US foreign policy in the wake of September 11, which has underpinned
two strands within the US politico-military establishment. After the
major initial successes achieved in the first phase of the war against
terror in Afghanistan, such rift has resurfaced now in the debates
surrounding the politico-military targets of the second phase, and
also impinges on the discussions on how to deal with the vast zone
of instability in Eurasia -the legacy of the demise of the USSR.
The "Powell fraction" poses a continued line of regional
balances of power (India-Pakistan, Iran/Iraq), the main leverage through
which Washington kept its tutelage in those strategic regions -using
for its own benefit the regional dynamics of power. The other wing,
represented by vice-president Dick Cheney and the Defense Secretary,
Donald Rumsfeld seeks to rely on a reactionary alliance of nations
that, through all-out military intervention or else tough diplomatic
pressure, wipes out or isolates those countries regarded as a threat
against key national interests of the US.
What runs through such stand-off is a different view around the US
global mission. On one hand, we see a more cautious wing inclined
to the preservation of the world status quo, since they are more aware
of the historic limits bearing down on the US hegemony; their main
purpose being to put down those regional destabilizing hot-spots threatening
the US security. On the other hand, we see a more adventurous and
aggressive wing who wants to uproot the symptoms pointing to a secular
US decline -which the September 11 attacks merely exposed in the light.
The second alternative is, from the standpoint of the established
balance of forces, extremely dangerous for the long-term interests
of imperialism and can lead to a further destabilization of the whole
planet, if implemented. Although the first phase of crusade against
terror has shown that both wings are far from being antagonistic to
each other, but rather can peacefully coexist within Bush's cabinet,
the victory in Afghanistan has tipped the balance strongly in favour
of the axis Cheney-Rumsfeld, the more unilateral-prone sector.
THE DEFEAT
OF THE TALIBAN AND THE ONSET OF A REACTIONARY CONJUNCTURE
X The ousting
of the Taliban regime and the establishment of an interim government
in Kabul has reinforced the grip of US imperialism and president Bush,
who is enjoying top popularity thanks to the military victory. These
factors have turned the present-day situation in a reactionary one.
The swiftness of the military intervention and the low numbers of
American casualties evidenced the overwhelming US military might,
which boosts the self-confidence of the imperialist chief-of-staff.
On top of this, another major reactionary element at work today is
the military deployments by the big powers that have rallied with
Washington and its crusade, fuelled by the drive against terror and
the fact that it has become a top priority for the US foreign policy.
Such powers are seizing upon the opportunity to further their own
national interests under the umbrella of the dominant power. Thus,
both Japan and Germany have deployed major contingents abroad for
the first time ever since the end of World War II -Japan in the Indian
Ocean and Germany in the African horn. England is leading the peace
corps on the ground in Afghanistan, a reaffirmation of London's will
to be the main ally of the US, which has given them an important role
in shaping the fate of Afghanistan. Such increasing warmongering in
the international arena is a major aspect of the present reactionary
conjuncture.
THE REINFORCEMENT
OF REACTIONARY REGIONAL AGENCIES
XI Another reactionary
feature of the reactionary conjuncture can be seen in the drive of
some minor powers to push ahead with local or regional demands by
jumping on board the train of the US crusade.
The regained legitimacy of the two year-long Russian crusade against
Chechnya is a point in case. In the past, the brutal military intervention
there and the violations of human rights by the Russian army rose
international attention. In the new atmosphere worldwide, full with
Washington's war against terror, Putin's government has been able
to persuade the West in holding back any kind of political or financial
support for the Chechen rebels.
In turn, India has also seized the opportunity and tries to wipe out
the Muslim fighters active in Kahsmir, in a drive to undermine Pakistan,
its regional competitor, by means of troop deployments at the border
and the implicit threat of a nuclear war. While trying to prevent
a regional war there, Washington uses his leverage with a two-fold
purpose: on one hand they want to get Musharraf to control or else
smash the Muslim terrorists, which have been formed or else encouraged
by the Pakistani secret service -as they did with the Taliban in the
past. The Pakistani president caved in to this pressure mounted by
India and the US, thus bringing about a turn-about in Pakistan's domestic
politics. As many as five Muslim extremist parties have been banned,
while hundreds of supporters of Islamic fundamentalism have been thrown
into jail.
Never mind that the Washington was able to keep India at bay during
the first phase of the war in Afghanistan with the aim of upholding
the anti-terrorist coalition in the Muslim world, the anti-terror
agenda has fuelled the reactionary appetites of India as a key strategic
ally of Washington in Asia.
SHARON'S ESCALATION
AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN MASSES
XII Washington,
right at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, proclaimed it stood
for the recognition of a Palestinian state. But as days went by, the
US policy veered towards an open support for Sharon's tough line and
war moves. The latter tries to turn the tables in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, to force the Palestinian people into giving up on their
national aspirations. In other words, he wants no more discussion
around the issue of the status of Jerusalem, to push ahead with Israeli
settlements and also bury the issue of the right of return of the
Palestinian refugees.
In pursuit of his political purposes, Sharon is ready to resort to
any means at hand, even going for the military re-occupation of all
the territories now controlled by Palestinian National Authority -handed
over to it under the auspice of the Oslo Agreements. Such political
and military escalation seeks, in the short term, to blackmail Arafat
into dismantling the Intifada and also push him to wipe out the Palestinian
"extremists" such as Jihad and the Hamas. However, it is
unlikely that Arafat succeeds in this, being cornered by both the
Israeli escalation and the increasing domestic opposition to his leadership.
That is why the government of Israel also contemplates replacing Arafat
as head of the Palestinian National Authority, while still recognizing
its legitimacy as a spoke-person of Palestinian interests. The die-hards
in Sharon cabinet want to go beyond that, smashing the whole PNA structure
built in 1993 at the onset of the peace process. On top of this enormous
pressure has come, in the last few days, the Bush administration that
has practically isolated Arafat and is now considering a wide range
of alternative policies, some of which go as far as cutting off diplomatic
links with the PNA.
AN INCREASING
MILITARY INTERFERENCE
XIII In turn,
the war against terror has led to increased US involvement in domestic
conflicts and civil wars raging in some countries. Washington has
given political support for them, and even sent military assistance
and equipment to the armies of such states.
This is the case of Colombia, where the government of Pastrana has
taken a tougher stance in the negotiation with the FARC, jeopardizing
the peace process and threatening to unleash a bloodbath if the guerrillas
do not cave in to his demands. This tougher stance by the Colombian
government is also a by-product of Washington's reactionary offensive
in our continent. It is also the outcome of the Plan Colombia, which
laid the basis for the re-armament and better training of the Colombian
army, which has also built closer ties to the US army. The US is poised
to set up a political control of a highly destabilized zone, namely
the north of South America, that is affected by drug smuggling, the
thirty year-long war of the FARC against the Colombian state and the
deterioration of the links with Venezuela ever since Chavez became
president.
But this reflects a deeper-going tendency: the US is about to send
Marines to Mindanao in the Philippines to launch joint actions with
the army there against Muslim extremist linked to Al Qaeda. Such deployment
of the US army is the biggest outside Afghanistan and hallmarks the
onset of the second phase in the war against terror. In turn, the
US have rebuilt their links with the Indonesian army, and are funding
the army of this vast country, after an interruption in the wake of
Suharto's downfall and the human rights violations in East Timor.
Such increased military interference in the domestic affairs of these
countries might lead to a destabilization of the governments in such
countries, fuelling an anti-American mood that will become a major
hindrance in the future.
THE 'REVOLUTIONARY
DAYS' IN ARGENTINA ARE A COUNTER-TENDENCY TO THE REACTIONARY CONJUNCTURE
XIV The
"revolutionary days" in Argentina provoked the revolutionary
downfall of De la Rúa's government and ushered in a revolutionary
phase, offsetting the tendencies at work in the reactionary conjuncture
signed by imperialist warmongering.
Although the new Peronist government is trying to defuse them, these
revolutionary developments might impinge on South American countries
and boost the resistance of the workers and the masses in the region,
which are now suffering a harsh recession, imperialist greed and the
austerity drives sponsored by the IMF and the local governments.
The revolutionary developments in Argentina take up the path initiated
by the mass upsurge in South America that kicked off with the fall
of Mahuad's government in the wake of the aboriginal peasants and
people's uprising in early 2000 -although in a changed international
situation after September 11. The revolutionary nature of the mass
backlash is reflected in the fact that two governments were ousted
in Ecuador in 1997 and 2000. It also nourished a semi-insurrection
in the Bolivian city of Cochabamba in April 2000, and some months
later, a peasant upswing ensued that cornered Banzer. Then came the
demonstrations against Fujimori in Peru, the protests against Cubas'
government that also defeated the military pronouncement by General
Oviedo in Paraguay -among the most important events.
All these developments in the region have transformed it in the vanguard
of the fight against the neoliberal onslaught that swept through the
semi-colonial world in the 90s. The slump in Argentina, which used
to be the pride and joy of neoliberalism both in our continent and
worldwide, is a quantum leap in this tendency. This has fuelled enormous
concern in the imperialist circles, which fear "political contagion"
might deal a deathblow to the beleaguered "Consensus of Washington",
the rallying platform for factions of the native bourgeoisie. The
internecine fights within the bourgeoisie have grown deeper because
the region is a field of competition for the US, the hegemonic and
historically dominating imperialist power, and the European imperialist
powers, particularly Spain, that gained ground in the last decade
via privatization. The world recession has heightened the frictions
among them, not only in the economic terrain but also in the political
arena, as shown by the European intervention in the Colombian peace
process.
The inter-imperialist rivalries, the internecine rifts in the ruling
class and the revolutionary emergence of the masses might all fuel
destabilisation in the US imperialism's "back yard". This,
in turn, might turn out to be a stumbling block in the US reactionary
crusade.
WILL WASHINGTON'S
PRESENT STRENGTH BE TRANSFORMED INTO A NEW RELATIVE STABILITY?
XV The
mass popularity of Bush, the swift demise of the Taliban regime, the
lack of mass protests across the Muslim world in rejection of the
US aggression in Afghanistan and the acquiescence of the international
community to the war aims of the US, have all boosted warmongering
amongst the politico-military establishment in Washington.
Right now, the US has stepped up the fight to smash Al Qaeda as an
international network operating in different countries. That is why
it has formed new political and military alliances with Ethiopia,
Kenya, Yemen and Sudan to have them as local allies to succeed in
its fight. They have taken a leaf out of Afghanistan's book. The failure
of their 1994 intervention in Somalia, in which they chased a "war
lord", has taught them the lesson also in the hard way.
But it was only after the victory in Afghanistan that they started
to speculate with big scale military interventions, even bigger than
the recent campaign in Central Asia. This is what the most belligerent
wings of imperialism are demanding -the so-called "hawks".
They see they have a historic opportunity to set the terms of the
US foreign policy in the forthcoming period, by launching strikes
against Iraq, this time ousting Saddam Hussein, thus tipping the tables
in their favour in that strategic region of the planet. On a global
scale, the US want to appear tough and assertive through a coup de
main and thus reestablish his military invincibility in such a way
so as to consolidate a reactionary situation worldwide, a new period
of relative stability for the next five years.
Apart from the mass opposition that such initiative would meet in
the Islamic world and also the imperialist countries, such perspective
comes up against the following obstacles:
-The failed attempt at capturing both the Al Qaeda leaders and Bin
Laden himself. Bush has smashed the Al Qaeda havens in Afghanistan,
but has been unable to prevent its upper echelons, and also Bin Laden,
from running away. This remains one of the top objectives of the war
against terror -a drawback the first phase has not yet resolved. Furthermore,
since the US government focused the crusade on Bin Laden's persona,
seizing him is a major issue for the it, hence the massive pressure
is mounting on Pakistan, where he might be hiding. If they fail to
capture him, the confidence in the Bush administration might falter.
-A thinly veiled crisis has opened up with Saudi Arabia. Ever since
September 11, the war against Islamic fundamentalism has fuelled a
thinly veiled crisis between the US and Saudi Arabia. The roots of
such crisis lie deep in the historic motives for the strategic alliance
between Washington and this top oil power in the Gulf area. This has
been a mainstay of the US policy in the Middle East -along with the
state of Israel and the Iranian Sha's regime right up to 1979-, but
the common grounds for such alliance have been massively eroded. Such
a conservative alliance came to life as a bulwark against the bourgeois
nationalist tidal wave initiated by Nasser in Egypt, which was supported
by the USSR and impinged on both Iraq and Syria, leading to significant
transformations there. Such alliance was reshaped to act against the
1979 Iranian Revolution, and they went for support of Iraq in its
crusade against Iran, and later switched to opposition against Hussein
when the Gulf War came. But Iraq today is massively weakened, the
USSR no longer exists and the main present-day enemy of the US has
become Islamic fundamentalism, which has strong roots in Saudi Arabia
itself. The Islamic factions, in spite of their fierce opposition
against the Saudi royal family, have links with it and there are also
Islamic sympathizers within it. That is why the US attempt at spreading
their crusade against terror to the Persian Gulf is not regarded with
sympathy by Saudi Arabia -which might even lead to it leaving the
US-led coalition altogether. Such move would have enormous strategic
consequences, jeopardizing any attempts at striking against Iraq in
the first place.
-Growing tensions between Iran and the US. Iran is concerned about
the US military build up in the Middle East, what might be an obstacle
for a renewed military intervention in the region -in stark contrast
with the Gulf War. Iran concerns flow from the fact that the US has
clinched solid alliances with Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and also several small Gulf states such as Oman. Furthermore,
the US have beefed up their military presence on Afghan soil -American
troops are deployed just 100 km away from the Iranian eastern border-
and also central Asia. On the other, the all-embracing "war against
terror" gives the US an unprecedented free hand in the Middle
East, targeting the Palestinian Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and the Lebanese
Hezbollah -all of them closely linked to Iran. This is fuelling new
tensions between the US and Iran, which have flared up in the recent
incident of the ship loaded with weapons for the Palestinians and
Iran's hostility towards Afghanistan's interim government.
-The Enron collapse and the implications for the Bush administration.
So far, a blend of renewed patriotism at home and military victory
abroad have rallied the US population behind their president, in spite
of the impact of the recession. The Enron affaire, i.e. the biggest
bankruptcy in the US corporate history, might smear the presidency
in an electoral year. This case of corruption involves the managers
of Enron, big bankers and also notorious members of the American establishment,
the Republican Party in particular -including the cabinet and the
president himself. If all the attempts at separating the Bush administration
from this scandal fail, it might seriously impact on the presidential
institution, thus confirming the view of many Americans who think
the president gives the rich and the big corporations a preferential
treatment. But never mind this scenario never comes true, the impact
of the recession on the US masses might potentially tear apart the
domestic front, as the full brunt of the crisis is being born by the
working class.
Bush's tough stance
and threatening tone in his "State of the Union" speech
reflected such tendencies at work. The mention of Iraq, North Korea
and Iran as "axis of evil" signals that Bush has sided with
the die-hards of his cabinet in the second phase of his war against
terror -although he failed to propose yet any concrete course of action.
The inclusion of Iran as a state supporting terrorism means we are
in for a re-shaping of the alliances in the Middle East, since this
pushes Tehran in the direction of Baghdad. Now, both have the common
goal of refraining the US might in the region -no matter their enmity.
The emergence of such regional entente is impinging hard on Saudi
Arabia that is now demanding a reduction of the US troops presence
on its soil, since this -given the changed scenario- might have negative
consequences for the Saudi royal family at home.
The US aim in this strategic region is to clearly separate the "rogue"
states from their allied ones. This is the case with Egypt, which
is more concerned now with Islamic fundamentalism rather than the
consequences of the Intifada in Palestine. Egypt, along with Israel,
might provide an axis against the Iran-Iraq bloc. Syria, on its part,
should side with one of the two camps.
XVI The
widespread consensus that Washington rallied during the Afghan campaign,
itself the byproduct of the horrified reaction to the brutal attack
on the WTC and also the worldwide rejection of the Taliban regime,
will hardly come by in the second phase of the war against terror.
There is a heated discussion now going on among the US allies around
what targets should be attacked next. The issues of the legitimacy
and the operational drawbacks of launching interventions against the
so-called "failed states" such as Somalia grow much bigger
when it comes to striking at the so-called "rogue states"
such as Irak. If Washington stroke against the latter, it can be seen
as acting in a too "unilateral" fashion.
In turn, pursuing intelligence, security or police actions by the
US security forces, both on US soil and abroad requires a certain
trust in the "good intentions" and the competence of the
US. But this might fuel tensions with the members of the coalition.
Already the US plan to take strangers suspected of terrorism to the
military courts, with the likelihood of any terrorist suspect being
sentenced to death, on top of the harrowing conditions of Al Qaeda
prisoners in Guantánamo have fuelled a big concern in Europe,
which demands that "human rights" should be observed in
the crusade against terror -or else another legitimating cover-up.
Keeping the coalition in place in the current circumstances will be
much harder than at any time during the war in Afghanistan.
A SYNCHRONISED
WORLD RECESSION
XVII The
successful imperialist offensive and the break-throughs in the diplomatic
and military agenda go hand in hand with the unfolding of a recession
in the world economy. For the first time ever since the years 1973-75,
the world is undergoing the first synchronized world recession engulfing
the three imperialist blocs (the US, Germany and Europe and Japan)
and also affecting the countries in the capitalist periphery. This
recession is not merely the conclusion of a cyclic recovery. It was
not sparked off by a correction of the stock market, but it was rather
triggered by a real fall of profits. It is a systemic crisis pointing
to the exhaustion of the neoliberal onslaught that the world bourgeoisie
-the US bosses in particular- resorted to try and snap out of the
crisis of accumulation bogging down the world economy since the 70s
-when the postwar boom passed away unceremoniously. In spite of all
kind of monetary and fiscal policies implemented by both the central
banks and the governments of the imperialist powers to kickstart the
economy, the systemic nature of the crisis prevents the world economy
from taking off, unless a massive destruction of capital is brought
about first. That is why the most likely perspective is a deepening
and a prolongation of the recession next year, and we cannot rule
out a generalized economic depression.
XVIII The
roots of the present recession are to be found in the changes that
took place in the world economy in the last few decades. The increased
rate of exploitation in the imperialist heartlands and the re-location
of capital in those areas with cheap labour, along with the technological
advances and the ensuing increased productivity in some branches,
all fuelled a recovery of the rate of profit -although it was not
restored to postwar levels. As a result of this, the accumulation
of capital was re-launched, in a drive that went hand in hand with
an increasing weight of finance all throughout the economy, fuelling
the emergence of the so-called "speculative bubbles". Those
dynamic geographical regions and branches that absorbed the surplus
capital displayed high rates of growth -in stark contrast with the
slowdown in most countries and the rest of the industrial branches-
as long as the boom lasted, giving place to a massive over-accumulation
when the boom went down. Such was the case in South East Asia in 1997
first - followed then by the crisis in the "emerging markets"-
and the high tech sector in the US underpinning the 1995/2000 boom
there at last. In a world economy growing increasingly dependent on
the US as a last-resort market, and given the lack of an alternative
powerhouse for growth, the world economy rapidly plunged into a synchronized
recession. On top of this, we should add the unprecedented growth
of world trade that has come to represent a 24% of the world GDP.
XIX There
is no easy way out of such vicious circle of a synchronized recession.
This is so due to the lack of new powerhouse set to replace the ailing
American economy.
In early 2001, Europe boasted about being such alternative to the
American powerhouse. But, higher unemployment and a decreased investment
and also the constrictions imposed on active fiscal and monetary policies
by the provisions of both the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability
and Growth Pact leave Europe with little chances to play such role.
Japan is hardly in a position to drive the world out of the synchronized
recession. The yen depreciation shows that Japanese policymakers see
the currency stimulus as fuelling demand abroad as the only solution
in the short term. The domestic demand is dead in the water, amid
record levels of unemployment and a growth of industrial and commercial
bankruptcies seriously affecting the banks, which threatens to spark
off a financial crisis this year. This perspective sends shivers down
the spine of many worldwide.
The countries in the capitalist periphery are neither in a position
to kickstart the world economy. The imperialist onslaught in the last
few decades meant opening up their economies and a subsequent crunch
of their domestic markets, which have done away with any possible
autonomous source of domestic demand. These countries have come to
rely on a world trade-driven external demand on a scale never seen
before. As a result of this, those countries are no longer able to
cushion the advanced world, as they did in previous recessions since
the early 70s.
China might be an exception to this tendency, since it still shows
high indexes of growth in spite of the deep recession worldwide. But
this is clearly inadequate with regards to the world economy, since
the Chinese economy accounts for an extremely small fraction of the
world's GDP yet.
Given the lack of alternative powerhouses in the world economy, everybody
is turning their eyes in the direction of the US economy. However,
the future does not look very rosy there, either. The fragility of
its economy does not guarantee a vigorous recovery. China is plagued
by a massive productive over-capacity, with a level of returns that
some commentators deem the lowest ever since the big Depression in
the 30s, so it is not likely that capital investment should lead to
recovery. It is least likely that the upturn should come from external
demand, given the synchronised recession and a high dollar. The only
remaining leverage is a continued level of consumption, but this is
at best a short-term source of growth. All the more so when the conditions
reigning in the last decade allowing for high levels of corporate
and private borrowing, along with the rapid hike of the value of assets
(the so-called "wealth" effect) have gone for good. Today,
the high levels of debt are a heavy burden bearing down on consumers,
aggravated by the income loss fuelled by the recession and the sackings.
The neo-Keynesian styled measures of Greenspan try to ameliorate this
by cutting interest rates to boost demand. But this cannot be sustained
for long. The perspectives, thus, are a weak recovery -we cannot even
rule out this variant a short-lived one (one or two quarters)- and
then the economy might plunge further into recession. But regardless
this last scenario comes true or not we do believe that the world
economy will not see a renewed impetus of the US economy, such as
that of the late 90s. These factors are looming in the horizon, and
the world economy can be left without any powerhouse at all.
XX The
peripheral countries are the weak links in the chain of the world
capitalism. Heavily indebted and affected by a massive deflation of
the prices of raw materials, their economies might as well implode,
thus triggering off a new debt crisis that will hit the imperialist
banks and the finance system worldwide very hard. This has already
happened with the default in Argentina which, no matter it had been
long forecasted, massively eroded the position of the Spanish banks
and corporations that had grown massively in the last decade. The
crisis is so deep-going that no zone of the periphery has been left
untouched. There are some exceptions, like Russia, China and India,
all countries that combine relatively high levels of protectionism.
This has enabled them to buttress the effects of the international
recession, although they have endured a fall in those branches linked
to foreign trade.
The export hubs of South East Asia, the main zone of accumulation
in the world economy in the last three decades, have been hit the
hardest. Their economies are profoundly affected today because of
the end of the high tech cycle on which they largely depended on one
hand, and the changes operated in the world division of labour due
to the rise of China -the main destination for foreign direct investment
seeking cheap labour- on the other.
In the Middle East, the fall oil prices and the massive reduction
in the incomes generated by tourism might fuel a new economic shock
that might send shock waves across this volatile region.
This is also the reality of the old semicolonies in Latin America,
and even in Eastern European countries such as Poland. In the face
of the reversal in capital inflow -a significant flow in the 90s-
they have failed to infuse dynamism into their economies. The Argentine
default is proof positive of this. The devaluation and an export boost
do not provide an easy way out today, given the recession in the world
economy. A continued deflation and recession combined with spurts
of sluggish growth is the likely scenario for such regions for the
whole decade ahead.
COMMERCIAL
WARS, PROTECTIONISM AND THE SPECTRE OF THE 30s
XXI The
slowdown of the world economy is nourishing future stand-offs and
economic disputes between rival imperialist powers that might trigger
off a commercial war and a protectionist spiral hitting world trade
very hard. The WTO dictum against US subsidies to their exports, which
empowers the EU to impose economic sanctions on US exports should
the US not abide by it, is a point in case. Imposing such sanctions
could trigger off a commercial war that would throw transatlantic
links into disarray, a dire perspective that none of them wants to
come true. However, the room for manoeuvre to work out this conflict
has narrowed a lot. The chances that the Bush administration could
get to persuade a reluctant congress to change the legislation equal
zero. Still worse, an attempt at pushing ahead a vote might raise
voices demanding the US withdrawal from the WTO, something that might
damage the system of world trade beyond repair. All this comes amid
a vitriolic atmosphere of distrust between both blocs as a result
of the US threat to impose import quotas on steel imports coming into
the US market.
This commercial dispute is not an isolated case, however. Japan's
decision to devalue its currency threatens to unleash a wave of competitive
devaluations in the region that will jeopardize the inter-state relationships
in South East Asia, particularly China, thus exerting deflationary
pressures on both the US and Europe. Japan's policy aimed at unloading
its crisis on the shoulders of neighbouring countries and also the
rest of the world in order to seize a bigger share of the world market
can further embitter the relationships between the main imperialist
powers, undermining the frail foundations underpinning the system
of world trade -the US pressure on Japan is already showing this.
This might indefinitely mire the coming round of WTO negotiations,
which the US succeeded in launching at Qatar in late November, two
years after the fiasco of the Seattle summit. On top of this, the
increased fetters on world trade, themselves the by-product of the
security measures adopted in the "war against terror" along
with the criticisms leveled at the IMF for its management of the crisis
in semicolonial countries like Argentina can all throw back the tendencies
to integration at work in the world economy in the last few decades.
The myth of globalisation, portrayed by the pundits of capitalism
as an inescapable thrust, might come undone if the synchronized recession
becomes a full-blown depression, fuelling tendencies to rely on regional
blocs.
XXII The
synchronized recession, the massive debt worldwide and the danger
of default in many countries, the strong contraction of world trade
-the fastest ever-, higher unemployment and increased corporate bankruptcies,
deflationary tendencies and the heightened commercial and monetary
disputes threatening to unleash commercial wars and a spiral of protectionism
-all these infuse the world economy with an atmosphere more and more
resembling that of the 30s.
Thus, we cannot rule out the ominous perspective of a stock market
crash, given all the abovementioned factors, plus the high price of
stocks combined with the four year-long fall of corporate profits
as a percentage of the national income. The speculative bubble nourished
by the massive liquidity injections by the Federal Reserve in the
wake of September 11 and reliant on an expected quick and vigorous
recovery -above all the widespread belief of investors that the US
could again endure a 90s-styled boom- might blow up very rapidly if
the American economy remains in recession for a longer period.
Still worse, the Enron collapse has put a question mark on the strength
of the assets in the US. Far from being an isolated case, it could
well speak volumes about the how sound the American finance system
really is. This might smear the gleaning appeal exerted by the US
markets on international investors.
This would be very dangerous indeed, because it has been the inflow
of capital that underpinned the massive current account deficits of
the US. This has reached record heights and it has kept growing, in
spite of the recession at home, because exports fell more rapidly
than imports in response to the recession abroad. Some analysts forecast
it will stand at 6.2% of the GDP by mid 2003 -660 billion-, a groundbreaking
record that will require the US to get 2 billion a day in order to
pay for it. In other words, the US is running an untenable current
account deficit. Its sudden undoing might precipitate the dollar into
free fall, unleashing a massive flight of capital with disastrous
consequences for the US financial markets, still blinded by their
recent "glory days". This massive current account deficit
is an expression of the unevenness in the world economy, which has
grown largely dependent on the American powerhouse as the main spring
of growth and economic vitality. Regarded from this angle, doing away
with the US current account deficit might further still more the depressive
tendencies, thus pushing the rest of the world down a road leading
to protectionist measures, in the quest for self-sustained growth.
CHINA AND RUSSIA
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
XXIII The
September 11 attacks and the US response to them are provoking great
changes in the inter-state relations. The most striking shift has
been president Putin's turn in the direction of the West, particularly
towards the US.
In the wake of Russia's default back in 1998, which signaled the failure
of market reforms, the rise of Putin consolidated a Bonapartist regime
relying on the security forces as its main prop, with the aim of salvaging
the process of capitalist restoration as a whole. In the domestic
front, its advance brought about an increased centralization detrimental
to the autonomy of the regions and a tougher stance towards the oppressed
nationalities, as shown in Chechnya. Placing himself as an arbiter
of the different restorationist factions, it checked and suppressed
some factions of the oligarchy and, favoured by the ruble devaluation
and the rise of oil prices, it launched a process of capitalist accumulation
-after years of destruction of productive forces, lack of investment
and capital flight.
In the external front, Putin tried to establish a more favourable
balance of forces to negotiate with imperialism -particularly the
US- Russia's position as an emerging capitalist power. It tried to
do so by seeking reliance in his nuclear muscle, in the links with
"rogue" states and, above all, by forming a rather informal
bloc with Beijing's restoranists against the US-hegemonic "unipolar
world".
The turn that came after the September 11 attacks means that such
policy has been dropped altogether, shifting to a temporal (shall
we say strategic?) collaboration with the US. Russia has now placed
itself as one the best pawns of the US to upkeep the status quo in
the world, especially against a common enemy-Islamic fundamentalism.
The economic grounds for such new role lie in Russia's new role within
the international division of labour. It has gone from being an industrial
goods and machinery producer for the third world to being an oil,
gas and mineral-oriented exporter. Such new place within the world
market can be seen in the "price war" that Russia unleashed
against the OPEC countries, violating all the quotas imposed on crude
production.
Putin's new orientation in foreign policy has come on top of such
economic transformation, in an attempt to woo and regain the trust
of world finance capital, which so far has been reluctant to engage
in business in Russia, with the aim of completing the process of capitalist
restoration. We are now confronted with the likelihood of Russia becoming
a semi-colony -a quantum leap in the imperialist take-over of the
country that would have massive consequences worldwide. The proposed
entry of Russia into the WTO in next 2003 might be an anticipation
of this.
The next few years ahead will be decisive for the course of the restoration
in Russia. We cannot rule out the vicissitudes of war against terror
nourishing new stand-offs, short-circuits or reversal in its flirtation
with the US. The question mark placed on the permanent deployment
of US troops in the former soviet republics of central Asia could
well flare up the tempers. We cannot either rule out a strong backlash
at home -where major reforms such as the elimination of the subsidies
to the households at still in wait. That is why, in spite of his rallying
with the US and the concessions he might be willing to give to imperialism,
nothing reassures Putin that he will not end up as Gorbachev in his
flirtation with the West -thus fuelling a tide of anti-American mood
that might eventually turn against him.
XXIV China's
entry into the WTO in November 2001 is a major event. It hallmarks
a significant break-through in China's integration into the world
capitalist economy. This will lead -in the next few years ahead- to
bringing down the main barriers blocking a take-over by the multinational
corporations (MNCs) of its economy (and domestic market). This, in
turn, will result in millions of sackings, on top of the already high
levels of unemployment.
Although lower than its previous records, China's growth of around
7% is still really surprising -given the recession bogging down the
world economy. China remains today a major attraction for foreign
direct investment (FDI) worldwide -not only as an assemblage base,
but also increasingly as a full-blown producer in some industrial
branches. Chinese "sweatshops" have muscled in, replacing
neighbouring countries as a source of cheap labour, and even loom
in the horizon of their distant counterparts -the Mexican "maquilas".
But in spite of such resounding political and economic achievements
and also its low-profile involvement in the coalition against terror,
the restorationist bureaucracy in Beijing fears that they could be
left out of Bush's "new order".
The inroads of capitalist restoration have brought about a big economic
growth, but also have widened the gap between the coastal zones linked
to the world market and the hinterland, in a drive potentially threatening
for its national unity. Such economic growth has increased China's
appetites to be respected and considered a regional power aspiring
to gain leverage on the world arena. Its rise is coming up against
the interests of the imperialist powers presiding over the world market.
Far from being able to put up with the emergence of a new rival power,
they rather need to further stabilize and deepen their take-over and
domination in those areas of the world, which provide markets, cheap
labour and raw materials for world capitalism. Standing in utter opposition
to this are the material interests of the oppressed and the exploited
that are reluctant to pay for the massive cost of the restoration-semicolonisation.
It also runs against the appetites of the restorationist bureaucracy
that does not want become a new bourgeois class doomed to play a secondary
role on the world arena.
This is what the Beijing bureaucracy fears the most. Although the
war in Afghanistan eclipsed them, the US-China disputes -which in
April 2001 ended in a diplomatic stand-off- will remain a major source
of tension in the next period ahead. The suspicions of the Chinese
bureaucracy towards Bush maoeuvering with Putin herald renewed conflict.
Right now, it has cooled down the links with their strategic ally,
Rusia. On top of this came Bush nuclear shield initiative, which threatens
to render China's nuclear weaponry obsolete.
THE EURO AND
THE DRIVE TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
XXV The
introduction of a common currency -the Euro- is, no doubt, a major
break-through for European imperialist powers. Its launch will spurt
the growth of intra-European trade and might also give momentum to
the investments by big European MNCs. In spite of the fact that the
dollar remains overwhelmingly the world's reserve currency -with the
economic perks this entails for the US-, the launch of the Euro means
Europe will be likely to compete with the US in this terrain also,
with massive geopolitical consequences. In this sense, it represents
a major break-through for the project of European integration.
However, the ongoing recession will put it to a hard test. Given the
world recession is set to continue, unemployment is set to grow, and
the fight for markets will also become harder. Against such background,
the rigid conditions dictated by the Maastricht Treaty will deepen
the crisis and fuel the contradictions among the various European
states. The harsh fiscal tightening imposed by the European Central
Bank, aimed at keeping inflation down is paramount. Such measures
were used in the past to prevent weaker currencies from undermining
the stability of the almighty deutschmark, but today are running against
Germany's interest since its economy is undergoing a serious recession
and needs a more expansive monetary policy and increased state spending.
Schroeder, the German chancellor, might be faced with defeat in the
forthcoming elections this year. He took office and promised he would
cut down on unemployment, but it stands at exactly the same level
than it was for years ago when he took office -4 million jobless.
The war in Afghanistan, in turn, and the disputes around subsidies
and the arrangements aimed at rejuvenating European institutions to
match the expansion to the east have all highlighted major differences
between the smaller European states and the main powers in the region
-with the former feeling overridden by the latter in the process of
decision-taking. Among the big powers, France -which right into the
early 90s had provided along with Germany an axis for the EU- sees
its grip is being weakened due to the expansion towards the east and
also the increasing weight of Germany in the world arena. Last but
not least, the launch of the Euro has already provoked a crisis in
the Italian government.
"DEMOCRATIC
REACTION" IS RUNNING DRY
XXVI The
"war against terror" has brought in its trail an unprecedented
curtailment of democratic rights and also a centralization of the
executive powers of the imperialist countries. The US is where those
changes are all the more evident. A largely discredited Bush had taken
office after the electoral scandal/fraud, but he is now enjoying 90%
popularity. The past two months have witnessed the rise of an "imperial-styled
presidency", shaped by the unilateral law-enforcement powers
of the administration. The new USA Patriotic Act just passed by the
Congress has deprived the judiciary from any faculty to check or monitor
the electronic surveillance carried by the intelligence agencies or
else the FBI. It also introduces long-term -and likely indefinite-
detainment of strangers without any formal charge against being laid
against them. But the presidency has also taken on new judicial faculties
that do not require the approval of the Congress, such as the presidential
decree dictating those people suspected of terrorism must be judged
by a military court, or else a new regulation enabling the federal
agents to record the conversations between the prisoners and their
lawyers without having to request the permission of any court at all.
Due to the thin line separating intelligence surveillance from delinquency
control, the new powers bestowed onto the presidency are not limited
to those cases involving terrorism, but can rather be extended to
ordinary criminal investigations. All these show that there is long-term
reactionary crusade at stake here seeking to impose new mechanisms
of social surveillance fundamentally aimed against immigrants, but
potentially targeting the whole population. This drive has gained
momentum in the wake of September 11, but it has been intensified
for some years now. They seek to curtail the legal rights conquered
through great fights by the racial minorities, women, the gay community
and other sectors throughout the century.
XXVII In
the semi-colonial countries, both the world recession and the US-sponsored
diplomatic (and sometimes military) onslaught are creating an enormous
social and political polarization there. This is manifest in the weakness
of the some governments and also the erosion of the social basis and
the bulwark of bourgeois democracy, under the double pressure of imperialism's
economic and political pressure on one hand, and the demands of the
workers and the people, on the other.
Argentina is a paramount example. It is a highly industrialized semi-colonial
country with an overwhelmingly urban population, and also the highest
incomes in the region. For the first time ever, the masses brought
down a democratically elected government. Bourgeois democracy was
unable to contain the tensions that had bottled up, thus being replaced
by both a beleaguered government and regime that are now busy trying
to hoodwink and derail the masses' offensive. Both the political awakening
of the masses and their revolutionary mobilizations run against the
likelihood of the old ruling regime being restored in a peaceful fashion.
It is most likely that new unstable governments will follow, seeking
reliance in one of the fundamental struggling forces -the imperialist
bourgeoisie or else the working class movement and the masses. Given
the mounting imperialist pressure and all the conditions mentioned
above, we cannot write off a sui generis Bonapartist government taking
office. This might as well try to rely on the mass demonstrations
to go for the nationalization of some major assets today in the hands
of multinational corporations and the imperialist banks. This might
well be an attempt at preserving the bourgeois regime as a whole,
thus blocking the development of a proletarian revolution.
Such tendencies are inchoately at work in Venezuela right now. There,
Chávez has passed new legislation timidly undermining the property
rights of the landowners and increasing the share of the national
state in the oil revenues. This had led to a head-on collision with
the most powerful bosses' chambers and the landowning organizations.
XXVIII
The centralization of power in the hands of the presidency, the reactionary
backlash against the democratic rights in the imperialist countries,
and the weakened semi-colonial regimes are all highlighting the limits
of the democratic reaction (or democratic counter-revolution) agenda.
This was a top leverage used by imperialism, hand in hand with military
interventions. Such policy became a top priority for imperialism in
the wake of its defeat in Vietnam. It was first implemented in a defensive
fashion, and later on, in the 80s and 90s in a more and more offensive
way. It was preemptively implemented in many semi-colonial countries,
in most of which bourgeois democracy had been by and large absent
throughout the XX century as a result of the massive political and
economic instability and also a heightened class struggle in them.
Such policy was a weapon the US resorted to buttress the decline of
its hegemony. In the 90s, it went along with "humanitarian"
military interventions in some hotspots, like the Balkans or else
Indonesia/East Timor and also reactionary pacts such as the Oslo Agreements
or else the Peace Process in Ireland.
Already before September, the enormous contradictions at work in the
world arena and the rise of Bush to power were heralding an erosion
of such policies aimed pinning down the contradictions both at home
and abroad.
The war on terror has fuelled this. In the next period ahead, then,
the works of bourgeois democracy, "humanitarian" interventions
and regional pacts will be rather exceptional. The openly reactionary
nature of the war against Afghanistan, the failed attempt at restarting
Arab-Israeli negotiations, and the military escalation by Israel are
all sings of this. To these, we should add the support of imperialism
to reactionary regimes (what Marxists call Bonapartist regimes).
A TRANSITORY
SITUATION
XXIX The
deep going systemic recession has wreaked havoc on the neoliberal
"paradigm" -as well as the slowdown in the 70s torpedoed
the Keynesian orthodoxy. The dislocation of the inter-state system,
along with the ailing "superpower" profile of the US, the
tensions and the polarization between the classes in the wake of September
11 all speak of a new world situation.
This change is no short-term shift. The depth of the contradictions
listed above point to the opening of a transitory situation that will
usher in a new balance of forces between the classes, tipping the
tables either in favour of imperialism or else the mass movement.
Its nature will take on a definite shape only when the instability
in the economic, social and political spheres of the world system
is worked out. This will fuel great national struggles, such as the
ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-state clashes (India and Pakistan)
and also great class combats. Either the world working class and the
oppressed peoples in the world step up their resistance -opening up
revolutionary processes or situations in some semi-colonial countries
and/or the advanced countries- or else imperialism will be able to
impose a new reactionary outcome through a combination of setbacks
and defeats.
September 11 marked the end of the preparatory phase, in which the
neoliberal offensive was losing ground in a piecemeal fashion. It
opened up a period of heightened class tensions, one in which both
revolution and counter-revolution will take on a more definite shape
-in contrast with the lower levels of class struggle of the last few
decades, the byproduct of the derailed revolutions in the imperialist
heartlands and a combination of bloody coups with low-intensity wars
in the periphery that closed down the 1968-81 revolutionary upswing.
XXX From
the standpoint of inter-imperialist relations, this new period is
not as yet characterised by an open fight for world hegemony. The
overwhelming political and military superiority of US imperialism
writes off a short-term challenge to its domination on the part of
its rival powers. Such imbalance of power between the US and its allies
is to account for the rallying of the latter behind the politico-military
goals of the US -this in spite of the big contradictions in the economic
sphere, and to a lesser extent in that of politics and military affairs.
In the short term, the biggest threats to its hegemony come from the
massive costs that go hand in hand with the role of the only superpower
in a position to safeguard the status quo. A mishap in his quest to
rebuild the imperial power profile might open up a strategic vacuum
that might fuel a dispute with rival powers, thus pushing them in
the direction of a bigger role in up keeping security and putting
down the flare-ups in their spheres of influence. They might also
be forced to get a leading position in international affairs, which
might collide with the US long-term interest.
THE CLASS
STRUGGLE
XXXI From
the standpoint of the mass movement, the response of the working class
and the oppressed worldwide to the new situation of a combined recession
and imperialist warmongering is lagging far behind.
The workers, the unemployed, the urban poor and middle class layers
that were the key actors of the "revolutionary days" of
December 19 and 20 in Argentina are, no doubt, the most advanced sector,
the vanguard of the working class and mass struggles worldwide. The
downfall of De la Rúa's government is the last example in a
whole series of mass uprisings that have brought down hated dictatorships
and governments pushing ahead with the IMF agenda -Albania 1997, Indonesia
in May 1998, Ecuador in 1997 and 2000, Serbia in 2000. In the Argentine
case, the urban nature of the process might herald a new wave of struggle
in Latin America, overcoming this time the peasant and popular nature
of those struggles that have influenced the Latin American vanguard
since the mid 90s -Chiapas, Ecuador, Bolivia.
The workers and the mass movement in the US are now placed in the
opposite, conservative pole. They have rallied with their government
pushed by the war hysteria and the patriotism cranked up by the chauvinistic
AFL-CIO union bureaucracy. This is to account for the unchallenged
wave of sackings -one the biggest and fastest ever in US history-
that has hardly hit many immigrants and illegal workers, the first
victims of a recession that is right now reaching out to the core
of the industrial proletariat, the car industry workers.
The European working class, especially the Italian and French workers
that were the vanguard in the mid 90s when it came to fighting back
neoliberal governments, even resorting to political general strikes
has been put on the defensive by and large -although we still see
many partial strikes. It is still on the defensive, after socialdemocracy
went into office, given the recession and the reactionary atmosphere
now reigning in the advanced countries. The likelihood exists that
Italy, where the Berlusconi government is pushing ahead to bring in
more flexibility in terms of jobs and pensions for the benefit of
corporations, a drive that has led the unions to break negotiations
with it, will be first place where the social truce comes tumbling
down.
XXXII From
the standpoint of the oppressed nationalities, the most determined
among them is the resistance being put by the Palestinian masses.
Their fight for national liberation has grown from a mass revolt in
the first months into a war combining terrorist and guerrilla attacks
that has seriously affected the security of the Zionist state. Both
the political and military pressure exerted on Arafat and other Al
Fatah leaders aimed at getting them to check and jail the guerrillas
might fuel a civil war there, aimed against the discredited Arafat's
leadership in the first case if this seeks to put up with the demands
of Israel. On the other hand, a military escalation by the Zionist
state might spark off a mass national liberation war against Israel.
Such perspective might destabilize the moderate Arab governments and
also has the potential for provoking a regional war. So far, however,
the masses in the region have remained by and large passive in the
face of the Afghan war -partly because of the little enthusiasm that
the police-styled regime of the Taliban inspired and also the preemptive
repressive measures of the governments in the region. A new humiliation
of the Palestinian case, or else renewed intervention against the
beleaguered Iraqi people, might provoke an explosion of anti-American
mood that might be also addressed against their own governments.
XXXIII
The anti-capitalist movement, which had become a major political actor
in the developed countries, has now been thrown into disarray in the
wake of the reactionary September 11 attacks and the ensuing crusade
and anti-democratic drive that accompanied the attacks on Afghanistan.
Capitalising on the reigning reactionary atmosphere, the reformist
wing of the movement has gained the upper hand. They separate the
fight against corporations from the anti-imperialist struggle and
seek to turn the radicalized youth away from the movement -the latter
being the main actors of the vanguard actions in the "Battle
of Genoa". The policies pursued by the European socialdemocracy
-for example Jospin has publicly endorsed the so-called "Tobin
Tax"- have led to the cooptation of important leaders of the
anti-capitalist movement.
Although the quick denouement of the Afghan war prevented it from
growing into a mass movement, an anti-war movement sprang up -in which
sectors of the anti-capitalist movement participated. The main protests
took place in Britain and Italy. In Italy, this movement came together
with the first major struggles waged against Berlusconi. These precedents
in two key US allies show that in the forthcoming second phase of
the "war on terror" such movements might radicalize dramatically
in a collision course against their own imperialist governments.
WITHER THE
WORLD SITUATION?
XXXIV In
the short-term, the situation seems to be heading in the direction
of an unrivalled US domination -at least if one buys into the rampant
triumphal mood of the US chief-of-staff and only sees the apparently
unlimited scope of the unchallenged "crusade against terror."
Such is the aim being pursued by the main policy-makers of the politico-military
establishment in Washington. They are convinced that once their credentials
of military invincibility have been restored, the world economy will
recover and the US will be in an invulnerable position once again.
But this is not a likely scenario, however, if one adopts a long-term
perspective. Such perspective should take into account the massive
accumulation of economic contradictions, the inter-state system and
the class struggle. Blinded in its crusade against terrorism, Washington
has now become oblivious to the dangers in the world situation. The
worsening of the recession worldwide -shown by Japan's slump- the
strong inter-imperialist rivalry and also mass upheavals such as Argentina's
all show that, notwithstanding Washington and its overriding prowess,
it can not deal with the whole contradictions and tensions coming
from the world situation. We cannot rule out that the US might try
to turn things over by resorting to a big scale political and military
intervention. Otherwise, the tendencies to increased instability will
grow unchecked in the first years of twenty first century, with new
atrocities and upheavals looming ahead, and also open clashes between
revolution and counter-revolution -all these typical of the twentieth
century. The revolutionaries are getting ready for such perspectives,
leaving behind us all the nonsense and mumbo-jumbo of the last decade
promising us a globalised, harmonious and peaceful world -which has
revealed itself as a wretched lie after the September 11 attacks.
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