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1
On October 27th 2002, millions of workers, vast layers of
the population, along with whole swathes of the middle class
and the landless peasants massively voted for Lula and his
Partido Travalhista (PT). This reaped a record 52 million
votes, riding a wave of great illusions and hopes of changes.
Thus, Lula won the election and became the president of
Brazil. The masses are seeking a solution to mass unemployment,
to the critical situation of the economy, to the privatizations,
the dependence from the powers abroad that has increased
the vulnerability of the country -in a word, a solution
to the appalling social inequality, the submission to imperialism
and the growing poverty. The overwhelming majority voted
in the belief that the new president will 'deliver the goods'
for them, after ten years of neglect of their needs.
This electoral outcome must be pondered within the context
of the political situation in South America, where the working
class and the poor peasants started to fight back the cutbacks
and the implementation of the 'neo-liberal' plans since
the second half of the ´90s.
The milestones of that wave were the peasants´ rebellions
in Bolivia in April and September 2000, and the peasant,
aboriginal and popular uprising in Ecuador in January 2001,
which forced the president to resign. In the last few years,
those struggles have also taken place in the main urban
centers, and also displayed a tendency to become generalized
-e.g. the December 2001 uprising in Argentina, the fight
of the Venezuelan people against the pro-imperialist coup
d'état in April and the recent mobilizations in Peru,
Uruguay and Paraguay.
From this point of view, the victory of Lula and the PT
in the presidential elections opens up a new political situation
in the country, signaling a major turn to the left of the
mass movement, which harbors illusions and hopes in the
future government. This turn-about will have immediate repercussions
across the whole Latin American situation, i.e., it will
be a phenomenon that will transcend the national frontiers.1
The developments in Brazil are turning this country into
a milestone in terms of the political, economical and social
situation in Latin America -a beacon for the Cono Sur (Southern
Cone, i.e. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile).
In the words of the IMF, Brazil is a key factor, not only
for South America but also for all the 'emerging markets',
in the sense that it will shape the future behavior of foreign
capital in those countries.2
A
preemptive policy to avoid the disruption of the unstable
equilibrium in the country
2
We are witnessing the first electoral victory of a political
coalition bearing features of a Popular Front in South America
since the '70s. It relies on a widespread popular support
and has strong links with the mass movement, which will
mostly regard it as 'their' own government. This coalition
emerged because the bourgeoisie needs to cushion the likely
outburst of an economic crisis, trying to prevent Brazil
from following a similar path to that of Argentina, and
other neighboring countries that are being shaken by huge
organic crisis, state crisis and the upsurge of the mass
movement. By the same token, they are trying to stave off
a massive shift in the balance of forces of the fundamental
classes -i.e., imperialism, the national bourgeoisie and
the proletariat, and their auxiliary forces. It is a preemptive
policy to safeguard the regime. The bourgeoisie was unable
to find a presentable candidate ´of their own´
due to the sheer discredit of ´neo-liberalism' and
the discontent of the masses; when the perspective of an
imminent default arouse, it was forced to resort to the
PT and Lula himself as a more solid ´alternative´
to preemptively derail the mass turn that was already in
the making, for the sake of upholding the ruling regime.
However, this process itself is bound to accumulate and
exacerbate all the contradictions at work, which are likely
to come to light in an overpowering fashion in the period
ahead.
The new government will have to deal with the huge illusions
and aspirations of the workers, the poor peasants and the
people, amid a deep slump both at home and abroad. On top
of this come the internecine fights of the bourgeoisie opposing
the new quarters that are getting ready to take over and
become the ´new´ ruling block, and those sectors
that gained the upper hand during the last period, more
oriented to financial businesses. This context means the
coming to office of Lula and the PT is not merely a reshuffle
of the administration, along the lines of the ones that
we have seen in various countries of the region in the last
few years. We witnessed the victory of a preemptive Popular
Front revolving around the PT, with a former steel worker
in the presidency allied to the most concentrated sectors
of the bourgeoisie -not only their ´left´ wings-,
which came to life not as a by-product of big mass struggles
-i.e., without political radicalization.3
The fact that the Brazilian bourgeoisie, the strongest ruling
class in the continent, had to resort to the PT bears testimony
to the erosion of its political hegemony and the cracks
in the ruling regime, which presided over the transition
from the military dictatorship to the current political
regime. The vigorous economic onslaught and its deep crisis,
the break down of the unstable equilibrium that prevailed
in South America during the '90s and the degradation of
bourgeois democracies in the continent, all ate away the
foundations of Cardoso's government and the hegemonic ruling
sector. The rifts opposing different ruling factions of
the bourgeoisie were fuelled by the collapse of the 'Washington
Consensus' and the blind alley that the ´neo-liberal'
agenda got caught in. Thus, one the biggest bourgeois-workers
parties in the world, with strong links to the mass movement,
completely adapted to the regime for many years now, which
played a key role in upholding the 'governability' during
Cardoso´s presidency, is at the head of the government
now to engineer a preemptive 'make up' of the Brazilian
political regime. For that purpose, it relies on the support
of the big bourgeoisie, while it has reaped an enormous
support among the masses, which harbor a big wish of change
after a decade of outright implementation of pro-imperialist
plans.
The bourgeoisie has trusted the PT with the task of helping
it prevent a likely economical, social and political catastrophes
because, on one hand, it has the necessary leverage to keep
the masses at bay due of its influence on the working class,
on the landless peasants and on the urban poor; on the other
hand, the PT has proved to be 'reliable' in those cities
and states it governs.4
During the '90s, the PT was a major bulwark for the bourgeoisie
democratic regime, acting as a 'responsible opposition'
within the capitalist order whenever a political crisis
burst out in Brazil, holding back any possible independent
actions by the mass movement, and channeling popular unrest
through the institutions of the regime. All that was done
in the name of 'order' and 'stability', using the slogan
of ´ethics and decency' as an instrument for the ´modernization'
of the regime and also to provide a cover-up for the internecine
fights of the bourgeoisie fights waged by the new hegemonic
sector -a policy that resulted in the people having to pay
for the crisis. Those political moves earned the PT the
trust of wide sectors of the bourgeoisie, after they had
governed in important states such as Rio Grande do Sul,
and also big cities such as Porto Alegre and San Pablo.
But also the option for Lula and the PT is a conscious policy
of a new ruling bourgeois sector, the so-called 'development-oriented'
one (desarrollista), which was cast aside during Cardoso's
government, at a time when the financial sectors were predominant.
At the same time, this new sector will also seek a ´negotiation´
with imperialism along more favorable lines, an option that
does not preclude membership of the AFTA. They might also
try to act as a privileged partner, one that maneuvers and
wrestles advantages from the weaknesses of the imperialist
policy in the region5, as we will explain further on.
Lula-Alencar's Popular Front is a preemptive move precisely
because it is anticipating the emergence of advanced developments
of the class struggle in Brazil, trying to stave off a major
crisis of the magnitude of those affecting other countries
in the region. By the same token, this preemptive Popular
Front is different from the classical type of Popular Front
that Trotsky had seen back in the '30s. Back then, the Popular
Front was the last-ditch governmental option for the ruling
classes in the face of sharp political radicalization or
else a revolution -a last resort option before either revolution
or counter-revolution came out victorious.6
Heightened
contradictions of the ruling regime
3
In the light of the mass left turn, we can say that an objective
change has occurred in the situation. In the words of Trotsky
asserted 'it is no secret for Marxists that parliamentary
elections...distort and even deceive as to the mood of the
masses. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the political developments
is reflected in the parliamentary elections...' This is
just the case in the Brazilian scenario today. The outcome
of the elections means the great political factors wrapping
up the contradictions of semi-colonial Brazil are gaining
momentum. With this we mean no major disruption of the unstable
equilibrium at home has occurred yet, i.e., the balance
of the antagonistic forces remains in place, which explains
the ´relative stability' thus far. And no break down
occurred because the masses so far have not set themselves
in motion, in a move challenging both the regime and its
institutions. For this reason we claim that this ´relative
stability' relies on the integration of a powerful bourgeois-workers
party into the bourgeois order, rather than the strength
of the bourgeoisie itself and its existing forces. At the
same time, both the subjectivity and the leadership of the
mass movement stand at an all-time low, as a result of the
influence of reformism and the big illusion of the workers
in it. The crisis of subjectivity of the mass movement,
along with the big illusions in reformism is to account
for the 'strength' of the regime.
Thus, the complete adaptation of the PT7 gives the Brazilian
regime a relative strength, specially compared with neighboring
countries, where the bourgeoisie does not count on highly-esteemed
leaders like Lula to mislead revolutionary developments
-such as Argentina's case. Marx himself by and large anticipated
this process. When describing the effects of the 'incorporation'
of the upper echelons of the oppressed classes by the ruling
classes: ´The more a ruling class is able to incorporate
the most outstanding men coming from the oppressed classes,
the more solid and dangerous their domination will become'.8
The undeniable fact is that the ruling regime in Brazil
has undergone a token strengthening, via the incorporation
of the PT, in stark contrast with most of the countries
in the region lacking such powerful misleaderships9. Now
then, the fact that the oligarchic Brazilian regime has
been forced to share office with a bourgeois-workers party
like the PT and a preemptive Popular Front reflects the
increasing obstacles the bourgeoisie is coming up against
due to the national, regional and international factors
abovementioned.
The fact that the Brazilian bourgeoisie, which had always
relied on ´oligarchic´ governments, has come
to rely on a steel worker and a bourgeois-workers party
to manage their administration is also a reflection of a
´degradation' of bourgeois democracy. That is to say,
we are not faced here with a 'business-as-usual' policy
from the ruling classes, nor can we consider it as a normal
'Big Frontist' bourgeois government, no matter how preemptive
that move might be. This is what explains the deepest contradictions
within the ruling regime, which cannot be explained away
only by the contradictions at the root of Lula's government
because of the illusions and the aspirations harbored by
the mass movement. Nevertheless, this so-called ´degradation'
of the Brazilian democracy should be approached carefully,
because unlike Bolivia or Argentina, there is no deep crisis
of the 'party representation' system here, which might be
the prelude for a break down of the class relationships
and the parties with them, ushering in a historical crisis
for the ruling classes. Even when it is obvious that whole
social layers, specially the middle classes, broke with
´their´ traditional parties, like the PSDB and
the PMDB, these remain big national parties which preside
over the most of the states that make up Brazil and are
a conservative bulwark in the current situation. Lula's
election itself shows symptoms of crisis because in a ´normal'
bourgeois ruling regime, the government is meant to be directly
controlled by the bourgeois forces themselves, without having
to resort to a bourgeois-workers party. Exceptional means
of leverage, such as popular fronts, semi-fascist coups,
are resorted to when the order of the democracy for the
rich needs to be re-established as the best wrapping for
the dictatorship of capital, but these are just ephemeral
episodes. For this reason, we assert that Lula's victory
is not a mere ´reshuffle' of the administration10,
but is rather a bulwark to prevent the further ´erosion'
of bourgeois rule -i.e., the new government, with the authority
that has gained before the masses, is being confronted with
the task of bridging the 'gap' that has opened in the ruling
regime. In this sense, it will try to rejuvenate the latter,
preventing the masses from going down the path of their
Argentine counterparts. When a 'crisis of authority' bursts
into the open, when 'voters' (the oppressed) no longer pursue
their interests by trusting their 'representatives' (their
rulers), Lula gets into office riding a wave of popular
support. This endows the new government with an enhanced
authority -a massive leverage for the bourgeoisie to weather
any likely storm in the future, because the illusions harbored
in Lula and the influence of the PT on the mass movement
might paralyze them. And this expresses, in a dialectical
fashion, the token strengthening of the ruling regime.11
The
PT's strategy and the agenda of the 'new' economic bloc
4
President Cardoso and his government rallied various bourgeois
factions around it throughout the 1990s, and he was in a
position to push ahead with pro-imperialist plans through,
which resulted in an increased submission of Brazil. He
was the spokesperson for an all-round bourgeois agenda,
which relied on uncritical alignment with imperialism and
also the upholding of 'neoliberal' plans, and which went
hand in hand with the prevalence of the banks, of finance
capital and big multinational corporations. The strong political
alliance that underpinned that government bore testimony
to a new hegemony that had been set up in the country in
the frame of the so-called 'Washington Consensus'. But as
the neoliberal agenda -with the ensuing loss of levers of
the local elite over the domestic economy- started to wear
out, an alternative project was devised by other bourgeois
factions, one that with a bigger emphasis on the national
economy. Lula and Alencar were both the standard-bearers
of that project, which was also nourished by the fat cats
of the so- called 'developmental' (desarrollistas) strands
of capital. These raise their own specific demands on economical
and political matters, and also pursue more bargaining with
imperialism with the aim of getting enhanced grounds for
'growth' at home.12
This
alternative plan has gained a new lease of life after Lula's
victory, and is being portrayed as a 'strategic' option
to prevent a total sell-out to imperialism -the Argentine
scenario- in a attempt to safeguard the interest of the
Brazilian bourgeoisie, the biggest in the region. In the
words of Horacio Lafer Piva, head of the FIESP13, the main
bosses' chamber, 'We are expecting the government to make
no less than a historical transformation. We [the industrialists]
should leave the phase of ostracism behind. We need to put
an end to the monetarist nightmare. The growth of industry
should be the main topic of discussions again.'14 Luiz Fernando
Furlan, one of the fat cats of the Sao Paulo-based agribusiness
and also a big exporter, known as a 'man of the FIESP' was
appointed as a member the government. The FIESP went on
the record stating that '…his appointment is a motive
of great joy for the whole productive class. In his post,
he will furnish new concepts to a team15 that places its
bets on pulling together as a single man, thus offering
the chance, for which we are pleased, of becoming interlocutors
and also put the production as full priority on top of Brazil's
agenda…It is a major break-through for the elected
president, Mr. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.'16 Its participation
comes on top of that of the vice-president, Mr.Alencar,
top boss from the state of Minas Gerais. A poll recently
done at the behest of the Industrial Federation of the State
of Sao Paulo -FIESP- indicates that 77% of the entrepreneurs
in the state is optimistic as to the future accomplishments
of Lula's government, believing it will be good or else
remarkable. 17 Thus, the new government reflects a change
at the level the ruling 'faction' of the bourgeoisie18,
being more prone to the interest of the bosses based in
the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais -a different strand
to the bourgeois alliance behind former president Cardoso
and his fully-fledged 'neoliberal' agenda. And this is,
along with the masses' rejection of the neoliberal agenda
and their aspirations for change, one of the key elements
that explain the endorsement of the bourgeoisie to Lula
as an alternative reshuffle. Thus, they have decided to
go for a new agenda, which we call a 'neo-developmental'
one because of the social strands behind it and the ideas
underpinning it as well.
This bloc seeks an enhanced bargaining and also association
with foreign capital for the sake of 'a productive undertaking
and growth'.19 This 'neo-developmental' strand relies on
handouts to industry, on an export-oriented policy, and
on import-substitution -which dictates pushing ahead with
fiscal and labor reforms. Lula's Foreign Minister put it
very clearly when referring to the negotiations for AFTA
membership. He said: 'our position is to get advantages
for those products deemed of interest for Brazil, but without
taking commitments that block the way for development schemes
at home, such as industrial or health schemes.'20 The outcome
will be shaped by the pressure of imperialism and the other
bourgeois forces at home that preside over local politics.
The
meaning of the 'Social Pact'
5
We have to ponder the significance of the new 'Social Pact'
now in the making. It is very symptomatic that the FIESP,
the main bourgeois lobby in the country, has said that a
big coalition 'above the parties' should be encompassed
by that 'pact'. Their model is La Moncloa's Pact in Spain.
Counting on the big support and the trust of Lula and his
PT, this Pact appears to be a tool for a bourgeois strand,
as we said above, to gain a new 'hegemony' over the country.
For that purpose, 'a new compromise' should be set for all
the classes, a new regulation between capital and labor.
This attempt at setting up a new socio-political ruling
bloc, never mind it is a 'balance between heterogeneous
sectors', pursues the aim of overcoming the profound slump,
which in turn dictates new pacts and major agreements should
be reached. The newly created 'Council for Social and Economic
Development' is instrumental to this plan. It is made up
of dozens of top local entrepreneurs21 , the main trade
union federations, like the CUT, Força Sindical,
SDS and the CGT. The MST (the landless peasants' organization)
has also reclaimed participation there, unfortunately. It
goes without a saying that new Pact in the making will entail
attacks on the workers: the labor reform, enhanced powers
for the bosses to hire and dismiss and impose a wage freezing,
tax cuts for the bosses to bankroll social welfare schemes,
increased union cohesion, power will be given to re-negotiate
contracts abrogating previous legal social provision furnished
to workers. On top of these will come the wholesale reform
of the pension system, a political reform to the party system
that will exclude small parties, a move that is a direct
attack against the left parties. The new Finance Minister,
Mr. Antonio Palloci Filho, a man of the PT, has already
set out the priorities of the government in his department:
'we have to block the indexation of the wages and stop inflation;
uphold the agreement with the IMF, gain some trust and bring
the dollar down, and above all we have to push ahead with
the Pension reform, along with the Fiscal and Labor reforms,
all of them priorities announced by the Lula.'22
The
fate of the new pact and the 'neo-developmental' plan will
be shaped by the relationship with imperialism. The recession
worldwide has left little room for maneuver for the local
bourgeoisies, and many things depend on the attitude taken
by imperialism and the unfolding of the economic crisis.
The imperialist agenda for the region seeks to take over
the domestic markets for their corporations, muscling out
the local bourgeoisie, while closing its own markets to
those products coming from the region -this might fuel tensions
and contradictions between this neo-developmental agenda
on one hand, and imperialism on the other, at least with
the policy pursued by the Bush administration today. The
American ambassador to Brazil, Ms. Donna Hrinak, is already
talking about 'hard' negotiations ahead. It is all too evident
that those sectors might seize the opportunity furnished
by the exhaustion of the Washington Consensus and the fact
that now clear imperialist agenda has come to replace it.
There is little room to implement a scheme along the lines
of that devised by Mr. Juscelino Kubistchek back in the
'50s, the heyday of developmental agendas in Brazil. Both
the historical context and the agenda pursued by US imperialism
these days have changed so much -back then even big imperialist
sectors benefited from it. The same happened at the time
of the military dictatorship and its agenda for 'modernization'
of the countryside, when top agribusiness corporations immensely
benefited from the production oriented for the world market.
But times have changed now, and the 'neo-developmental'
scheme might not even take off eventually, as the Brazilian
sociologist Emir Sader has warned recently. When the new
appointments for the government were announced, he replied,
'it is impossible to change and make this country grow if
the government leaves the hegemony of finance capital intact.
Either Lula breaks away from that hegemony or else he will
be devoured by it.'23
If Brazil
proceeds along the lines of such a project, those 'productive'
quarters of the beleaguered Latin American bourgeoisies
might see an opportunity there. Such a plan can only be
thought on a regional scale, hence Lula's emphasis on rejuvenating
the MERCOSUR, a move clearly seen in his recent trip to
Argentina. But should all plans fail, given the recession
engulfing the world today, the imperialist pressure and
heightened tensions among the classes can accelerate the
tempo of events and fuel sharper political struggles -which
in turn might lead the ruling classes to a stalemate.
Crisis
in the realm of politics and the economy
6
When the election campaign was in full swing, the economic
crisis peaked and the dollar displayed a rather jittery
behavior, but Brazil eventually did not plunge into an open
crisis like that of Argentina. However, those economic woes
clearly revealed the submission of the country to the IMF
and the United States, and also its vulnerability in the
face of the financial shocks worldwide. A recent report
published by the Central Bank states that the crisis of
the second semesters has been 'overcome'. However, the recent
data tell us a very different story. The ever-increasing
cost of living, the growth of unemployment, the comeback
of inflation, the hike in interest rates, the wild swings
of the local currency and the fall in foreign direct investment
are symptoms of a deep-going structural crisis. The fact
that a default should be ruled out in the short term does
not mean it can be completely discarded. A recent IMF report
ranks Brazil on a par with countries like Uruguay, Paraguay,
Ecuador and Venezuela, as a candidate for a likely default
in 2003, given its unsound public finance and the uncertainty
reigning in the political scenario. The inflation reached
some 10%, according to the most optimistic estimations,
and the unemployment in Sao Paulo stands at 20.4%. It is
true that the trade balance yielded some 12 billion dollars
worth of revenues this year, but it does not mean the economy
is in good health. Such surplus was rather brought about
by the devaluation of the currency, which boosted exports
and cut down on imports. Beneath this, we see the industrial
production has shrunk, in an economy already in recession
that badly needs access to 54.5 billion dollars yearly worth
of foreign loans to keep going.
This means that if the 'catastrophic element', in the words
of the Italian Marxist, Gramsci, should burst into the realm
of the economy, a political crisis might unfold in the open.
But we know that an economic crisis becomes a political
crisis if it reaches out both the regime and its institutions.
A slump can only bring forth a fertile soil for the disruption
of equilibrium. Thus, 'a short-term economic crisis might
be ruled out to provoke fundamental developments; it can
barely bring forth a fertile soil for some ways of thinking,
of formulating and working out the issues concerning the
whole further course of the life of the state.'24
The majority of the left-wing parties are predicting that
Lula's government, by its own nature and the political decisions
it has taken, will preside over an economic catastrophe.
They even compare him to the ill-fated De la Rúa's
government in Argentina. But a capitalist crisis is not
enough in itself; the crisis should also engulf the political
institutions and the parties as well, with the alienation
of the exploited classes and its allies. But we say that,
in the present situation, if the recession ends in collapse,
for instance a default, it would also become a major political
debacle. The illusions and the wish for a change underpinning
the left turn of the masses has resulted in a positive outcome:
its energies have been released, and the middle classes
have also shifted, becoming alienated with the previous
hegemonic project. These will put to the test the ability
of the PT to act as a bulwark for the ruling regime. This
means that if 'the catastrophic element should burst onto
the economic realm', it might open up a crisis of bourgeois
rule challenging the ability of any political force to act
as a bulwark, with a likely upsurge of the mass movement.
Hence, we believe that a historical crisis might break out
as the result of a slump combined with mass actions.
In spite
of its scope, the 1999 crisis was not strong enough to engulf
all the institutions and the regime. It did not become a
social and political crisis, precisely because the PT acted
as a major bulwark back then, and also because the masses,
the middle classes in the main, were yet tied up to the
old bourgeois hegemonic project incarnated in the consensus
around the need to implement a 'neoliberal' agenda. This
accounts for the fact that the government was able to finish
off the one-to-one parity of the real and the dollar, hitting
hard the wage earners and middle-class depositors alike,
without unleashing a political crisis. Contrary to what
Mr. Armiño Fraga claims, the crisis was not overcome
thanks to the measures implemented by the Central Bank and
the Finance Department -those might have had a countervailing
effect on the crisis, but social containment played a key
role at that time. Nowadays, in spite of the massive unrest
voiced at the elections, the economy has not been thrown
into disarray, although things look really gloomy last October.
The masses, for their part, did not come into the fray before
or else after the victory of the preemptive Popular Front
-not even the vanguard waged any fight at all. The combination
of both would have disrupted the balance between the existing
political forces. Has the Brazilian bourgeoisie left behind
such scenario? We do not believe it to be the case, because
the contradictions keep piling up and growing apace, and
they will either gain momentum or become weakened in tune
with the evolution of the international situation and the
mass actions. The economy remains a factor of instability.
But in the face of the new contradictions that have arisen
today, a 'catastrophic denouement' would seriously impinge
upon the ruling regime, since it would hit the PT -the main
bulwark that the bourgeoisie is relying upon to get through
the next period ahead- very hard, eroding the rest of the
institutions as well.
Imperialism,
Brazil and Latin American politics
7
Since the early '90s, when the 'Washington Consensus' and
neo-liberalism were having their heyday, the US policy in
the region has brought about a deeper economic and financial
colonization and also a humiliating political subordination.
But in the last few years, that imperialist offensive came
up against the increasing resistance put up by the mass
movement. It has also met the increasing reluctance of some
bourgeois strands seeking more favorable terms of negotiation.
The tenets codified by that 'consensus' -i.e., the economic
opening, privatization, guarantees to foreign investments,
etc- no longer enjoy a widespread social and political support.
Nor can the expectations in economic growth of the early
1990s be recreated. And this is fuelling contradictory tendencies,
both in terms of the countries that have aligned with the
US, but also at home, with internecine rifts in the bourgeois
bloc.
In Brazil, such standoff burst into the open both before
and after the elections, with a new social and economic
strand trying to win the upper hand and become hegemonic
under Lula's government. For instance, this new sector is
opposed to accepting the conditions dictated by the US for
the 'free' trade agreement. They do not oppose AFTA membership,
but they are seeking better conditions for Brazil's entry.
25 For the bourgeoisie, it is all about reducing risks and
seizing on the opportunities provided by a continental bloc,
and also get Washington to recognize Brasilia as a privileged
partner and a regional power as well.26 We should bear in
mind that under Lula's administration, Brazil will preside,
along with the US, over the negotiations for the AFTA, which
should be finished by 2005.
The
new president and also part of his political team met president
Bush last December 10, and the American president will visit
Brazil in April this year. The meeting was deemed a 'success'
by both sides. A mouthpiece of the Sao Paulo-based bourgeoisie,
the daily Estado do Sao Paulo hailed the new line of the
government in these words, 'everybody knows what the relationship
between the US will be like: it was defined at the extremely
cordial and very fruitful meeting between the elect president,
Mr. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and president Bush
at the White House. He also stood by the project, announced
both by Lula and Mr. Aloizio Mercadante, of achieving a
trade agreement between the MERCOSUR and the United States,
on the fringes of the AFTA. With regards to the rapprochement
to China, India, Russia and South Africa, that is no 'third
world orientation' at all, nor is it a novel move by the
PT. Those are countries with big domestic markets and a
rather satisfactory growth, which have already been put
high on the agenda at Itamaraty [the house of government]
and the Development Department, which have recently sent
off trade delegations on a ministerial level there'. 27
While Lula was committing himself to support an eventual
war on Iraq, within the regulations of the United Nations,
he also asked Bush to intervene in the financial markets
so that the American banks started fresh loans to Brazil,
and he also sought a 'joint solution' for the Venezuelan
crisis. 'Loans, loans, loans', those were the three things
that the new government asked to the Vice-chair of the American
Treasury, Mr. Kenneth Dam.
This in tune with the facts revealed by the New York Times
in the wake of the elections: 'Foreign investors and finance
institutions alike must give the new government some room
for maneuver and understand Lula's political stance…
For the Bush administration, Lula's triumph represents a
unique opportunity at a time when the Latin American countries
felt, with total justification, that Washington was neglecting
them. President Bush must commit himself to Brazil in closer
and more respectful talks for a trade agreement covering
the whole hemisphere, besides showing understanding for
the financial woes of the country. Such initiative would
help disappoint those looking forward to a revival of the
left in South America that will be followed by renewed anti-American
moods.' In other words, the United States are concerned
with the political instability in the region, and want to
prevent a re-run of the Venezuelan events elsewhere. That
is why the politics pursued by the new Brazilian government
in the region become relevant for the United States. At
the same time, Brazil rises up to the status of a regional
'power', from which new benefits might be obtained.28 And
Lula himself can do an excellent job for US imperialism.
'We shall look at our South American neighbors with a special
attention, because we will promote political, social and
economic stability throughout the region, in the framework
of peace and democracy'29, said Lula to president Bush recently.
As much as 'closer ties' with Brazil on the part of Bush
just seek try to stave off a deeper financial crisis to
protect the interest of US multinational corporations, this
is also true of the rest of the Latin American countries.
The Financial Times points out that 'closer cooperation
between Mr. Bush and Lula will help ease the regional tensions
and to cover up the lack of policy for that region as well,
which was all too evident in the wake of the September 11
attacks. The leftist record of the elect president and his
talent for negotiation, as well as the political capital
he earned through the huge poll reaped at the election in
October make him an indispensable ally. The grave political
crisis in Venezuela…might be a test for such a perspective.'30
All indicates that the new government will make South America
its priority and will also further the economic integration
of the southern region, to use it as a platform for negotiation
with imperialism, so that it will provide the latter with
their good political services in exchange for economic concessions.
The initiatives of the new government to go for the political
and institutional invigoration of the MERCOSUR -today in
tatters- represent an attempt, on the part of Brazil, of
opposing a 'South American bloc' and use it to bargain the
membership to the AFTA from a stronger position.31 This
is very important, because it will surely inaugurate a period
of negotiation and tug-of-war wrangling with the US to settle
the disagreements. The rifts nourished by such move will
in turn fuel new political phenomena. Without challenging
the subordination to the dictates of imperialism, they are
seeking a 'compromise' between the appetites of foreign
capital on one hand, and the 'strive to exports' and the
domestic market on the other. Such compromise is devised
to provide some kind of shelter for the bourgeois sectors
oriented to the domestic market -the big local trusts and
multinational corporations- that are confronted with serious
risks in case the negotiation for AFTA membership proceeds
along unfavorable lines. We are confronted with a defensive
program with 'neo-developmental' overtones seeking to rely
on foreign capital as an associate, while protecting some
domestic havens for capitalist accumulation. The Republican
victory in the US election will push Bush in the direction
of a more aggressive foreign policy. But the US's policy
is a pragmatic one. We have to wait and see how it unfolds
in Latin America.
The
working class movement and the masses
8
The masses spoke with their own voice at these elections,
to the extent that the bourgeois parliamentarian regime
and the brake of the union bureaucracy allowed them to do
so. How long will it take for them to resort to 'extra-parliamentarian'
ways of action? How long will the 'honeymoon' with Lula-Alencar
last? The different phases along this road will be hinged
upon a whole series of political developments, boosted by
the emergence of new mass movements and a major shift in
the mood of the masses.
Nowadays, we are confronted with a crisis of proletarian
subjectivity, and also that of the masses themselves. The
decade-long imperialist offensive downloaded over their
shoulders is being felt yet, and the old leading institutions
have been fully integrated into the bourgeois order as well.
The masses had started to gain a renewed confidence in their
own forces during the great 1979-81 upsurge, when many factory
committees sprang up, thus laying the basis for an independent
labor policy, a drive that was undermined by the reformist
leaders of the PT and the backlash unleashed by reaction
as well. Those factors eventually wiped out the very idea
of achieving a radical social change from political horizon
of the time. 32 The more far-sighted and active sectors
do not feel part of a colossal social and political force
incarnated in the prowess of the proletariat, a perspective
that materialized back in the late '70s. The influence of
reformism, today in office, means that a revival of the
working class subjectivity will be a tortuous, uneven and
contradictory process, one that will be full of defeats
and failures.
A new revolutionary subjectivity of the proletariat will
come about in Brazil as a result of inevitable defeats,
vacillations and victories, which will lay the basis for
overcoming the crisis of revolutionary leadership of the
mass movement, fighting resolutely against the centrists
and the reformists alike. Only out of this experience will
a real mass revolutionary movement come to life, outdoing
the reformist PT and the capitulating centrist forces active
within it. The experience of the masses with the pro-bourgeois
PT leadership, which is now in office, will proceed through
a protracted combat against deception and betrayal. But
for all the influence of the PT, the Brazilian regime now
headed by Lula's government, is coming up against a big
contradiction -i.e., 'delivering the goods' or at least
some bottom-line satisfaction to the demands of the masses.
These cannot be met with state-funded relief alone, without
tackling the structural causes provoking a dearer cost of
living, the fall of wages and salaries and unemployment.
Doing so requires challenging the interests of the bosses.
This issue, given the recession both at home and abroad,
is no easy thing, and might lead to big struggles and their
radicalization as well. Hence, it is very important, to
take steps ahead, to chart the lines that the mood of the
mass movement will proceed along. What will it its shape
be like? What will its main features be? What about the
tempo and the direction of the whole process?
It cannot
be ruled out that Lula's government, once the 'honeymoon'
with the masses and imperialism is over, presides over a
wave of labor and people's struggles, initially fuelled
by illusions, because in the 'democratic and reformist'
project no room has been left for any relevant economic
concession for the masses. Folha do Sao Paulo puts it this
way: 'If Mr. Cardoso could push through a whole set of modernizing
reforms in the most critical moments, what will the reaction
of the PT be when the high hopes of its voters are met with
frustration? And should the country go through severe external
crisis, will the pro-market agenda be upheld?' The role
of the middle classes will be a key factor here, since they
were a key support contributing to Lula' s victory. Fearing
a renewed instability as a result of the wearing out of
the neo-liberal agenda, they switched to opposition to Mr.
Cardoso's government. But we know that the working class,
along with other social sectors, will be hit very hard,
since all the agreements and pacts clinched between the
various ruling factions will fail to deliver any solution
at all for Brazil's burning problems. New attacks, never
mind how disguised they are, will provoke a mass backlash,
sparking off a mass mobilization that might turn against
both the government and the regime. Lula has promised to
resort to all the power of its regime to crack down on 'illegal'
occupations of big estates, a move that is in collision
course with the program pursued by the various organizations
of landless peasants. We need to stand by the middle layers
when the time for social discontent comes among them. A
revival of the struggles might be nurture by a massive movement
of landless peasants, when Lula fails to address their demands
-a major peasant upsurge took place in the second half of
the '90s.
Nevertheless,
Lula's government will try and deliver some social provision
for the mass movement (although it will be different from
classical reformism), handing out some minimum concessions,
and probably refraining from launching any attack against
labor in the first time. It could as well be the case that
some camouflaged attacks are launched against the 'labor
aristocracy' combined with wholesale distribution of relief.
The much-vaunted 'Social Pact' now being negotiated, and
the truce handed over by the MST (landless peasants' movement)
and the CUT (main union federation) to the government are
a brake holding down any likely mass action right now. That
means the working class movement and the people will have
to outdo big fetters if they want to wage any serious political
struggle. But there is no Chinese Wall that the masses cannot
climb over, surpassing the obstacles blocking any political
endeavor they might try. The developments on the international
arena, mainly the advanced events in Argentina might contribute
to a political revival of direct action and a reinvigorated
trust in their own methods of struggle.
But although the tempo of the national situation may be
slower for some time, due to the token reinforcement of
the bourgeois democratic regime and the existence of a misleadership
as big as the PT, and also the MST and the CUT, a major
destabilization might be brought about with the likely outburst
of the Brazilian toiling masses on to the scene. The big
internecine rifts opposing different strands of the bourgeoisie,
the likelihood of a standoff with US imperialism and frustrated
mass expectations can all stir the flames of unrest eventually.
The
nature of the future government
9
Right now, as we go to press, Lula has just been sworn in
as president of Brazil. His cabinet and the alliances in
the parliament have been defined already. The parliamentary
alliance clinched by the PT with the old right-wing party
-the PMDB- and the negotiation around the presidency of
both houses of parliament seems to be almost settled. The
elect president has appointed industrialist and entrepreneurs
to his cabinet, and also those parties like the PPS, the
PDT, the PSB, the PTB, on top of which came its staunchest
supporters, the PCdoB and the PL.
Lula and the strong men of the PT surprised to their friends
and enemies alike with the members making up their government.
The former CEO of the Bank Boston until last August -that
bank is the second largest creditor of Brazil's external
debt- and recently elected federal deputy on a PSDB ticket,
the party of former president Cardoso and his failed successor,
Mr. Serra, has been appointed as president of the Central
Bank. Enrique Meirelles was the first Brazilian ever to
chair the American Chamber of Commerce, and shares a seat
with the tycoon David Rockefeller at New York City Investment,
being the only foreigner among its distinguished board made
up of 22 consultants.33 A former advisor to the IMF, a strong
man at the World Economic Forum in Davos and a top fat cat
from the Sao Paulo-based agribusiness as well as a big exporter,
Mr. Luiz Fernando Furlan has been appointed Minister of
Industrial Development and Trade.34 He was also linked to
the PSDB, and he actively campaigned for Mr. José
Serra, Cardoso's failed heir at the last elections. Mr.
Celso Amorin was assigned to the post of Foreign Affairs.
This man also served as a minister for president Itamar
Franco and was also an official for Mr. José Sarney's
administration, he has also links with the PSDB, although
he is not a full member of it -and the same goes for the
Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Roberto Rodríguez, a
fat cat in Brazilian agribusiness.35 And on top of them
comes Mr. José Alencar, the current vice-president
and also a textile tycoon.36 These are just some of most
notorious figures, apart from other representatives coming
from bourgeois quarters that have been appointed to lower
ranks in various departments of the administration. Obviously,
most of the cabinet posts have gone to the hands of PT's
representatives coming from all of its wings, who have taken
over key posts such as the Finance Department, the Department
of Mines and Energy, etc. Even a top representative from
the Catholic Church has been awarded a top post in Lula's
administration, the bishop from Duque de Caixas, Mr. Mauro
Morelli. This gives us a clear picture as to the composition
of the new government. Lula will be the umpire presiding
over all those sectors and the other allies, with the posts
in social provision going to the hands of other PT members.37
But regardless of the participation of all those quarters
in the administration, Lula's government is a bourgeois
government relying on a preemptive Popular Front, in which
the PT takes over most of the cabinet posts hand in hand
with big business. The current government is not one of
'national unity', although it partakes the latter given
its party composition and the participation of the bosses
in it. We might see the following scenarios in the future:
a government of national unity, with the open participation
of other big mainstream parties38, a labor-styled government
made up of the PT solely with big gestures in Parliament,
or else a classical Big Front government. One or another
variant will be the outcome of the balance of forces between
the local classes and the relationship with imperialism
in the period ahead. The predominance of one or another
is hinged upon the dynamics of the situation, mainly the
course of the action of the masses, if they ever burst onto
the political scene putting a high pressure on Lula's administration,
pushing it to the left, thus paving the way for a more classical-styled
Popular Front.
Trotsky
pointed out that 'the government in backward countries,
be them colonial or semicolonial, takes on a Bonapartist
or semi-Bonapartist nature (…) The government wavers
between foreign and local capital, between a relatively
weak bourgeoisie and the a relatively powerful proletariat.
These endow the government with features of a sui generis
Bonapartism, one of a peculiar nature. It raises itself
upon and above the classes, so to speak.' And this much
is true of Lula's Popular Front government, located in a
semicolonial country. By the same token, we might be in
for two likely scenarios: a) if the economic crisis should
deepen, or else Brazil defaults on its debt, Lula might
be forced to seek reliance in the masses, fuelling a standoff
with imperialism, thus becoming, to a certain extent a more
sui generis Bonapartist government veering to the left;
b) should the 'catastrophic element' make a dent into the
economy, the government might seek reliance in imperialism,
thus becoming a right-wing Bonapartist government ready
to take on the masses. These two likely scenarios will bring
about a political earthquake, torpedoing any 'neo-developmental'
project as the ones we mentioned above.
It is
quite obvious that these two scenarios are predicated upon
general tendencies, and insofar as an economic catastrophe
is avoided and the mass movement remains out of the streets
we might see in-between scenarios as well. If the cost of
living keeps on rising, aggravating the living conditions
of the many -for instance, a series of bill hikes like the
ones implemented by former president Cardoso- Lula's government
might be confronted with a series of demands it will be
unable to meet in the short term. The crisis comes about
as a result of a combination of different phenomena, the
ensuing instability might lead to a process of 'various
shades of gray' leading to a right-wing or else left-wing
variant of Bonapartism, depending on the situation. In this
case, it may as well turn out to be a kind government with
'some degrees' of Bonapartism to uphold the 'cross-class
compromise'. This would be reflected in all-round economic
pacts with the unions and also party-political agreements,
like the one in the making. The current composition of Lula's
government already bears some of these features -we see
big business taking over key departments alongside with
PT quarters, including Democracia Socialista, taking over
other no less key posts, and all this propped up by the
big alliance engineered by Lula himself. Should the crisis
deepen, this tendency will gain the upper hand, which in
turn might lead to future trouble when it comes to staffing
governmental departments expressing this 'cross-class compromise'.
Lula remains the axis of the present administration. It
is also worth noting that the conservatives hold a majority
in Parliament, and most of the states are governed by the
PSDB, PFL and the PMDB. That is why a government with the
PT at its core, revolving around the figure of Lula himself,
might lead to a government with those characteristics -the
Brazilian political system allows this in fact.
In order
to better approach the new developments that might be ahead
of us, we have to understand, for instance, that one or
another scenario will come to prevail as a result of the
balance of forces between the fundamental classes in society.
In this regard, we must take into account the relationships
between the main contingents (their different social and
economic position, etc) in those classes, and also those
in the auxiliary forces that submitted to the influence
of the hegemonic class -the bourgeoisie. With regards to
the proletariat, the likely action of the million landless
peasants in the countryside and those undertaken by the
impoverished layers in the cities will surely impinge upon
it. When it comes to the bourgeoisie, we can say that she
counts on a favorable relation of forces, with both actual
and potential allies as well, as a result of the co-optation
of the PT -with this, the ruling class has a key leverage
at hand.
But
as we claim in this article, from a dialectical point of
view, insofar as the PT administration is a token rejuvenation
for the bourgeois democratic regime, its incorporation is
at one and the same time a degradation of bourgeois democracy
itself. As a whole, there are massive unresolved contradictions
at work in the present situation. They might end up cornering
Lula -the 'fears' he is reported to harbor. He is fearful
of an awakening of the mass movement, that the turn to the
left at the October 27 election might turn into actions
on the streets in the face of unfulfilled promises and frustrated
demands. Above all, he is afraid to appear as a troublemaker
in the eyes of his bourgeois allies, as someone who 'fuels
unrest', if not out of ill-will, at least due his inability
to check the powerful forces that he might unleash himself.
Right
now, in the wake of the victory of the preemptive Popular
Front, our both policy and program has to start from the
high hopes the mass movement harbors in Lula. Of course,
we revolutionaries do not share such illusions, but 'we
have to deeply seize upon those progressive elements enshrined
within them'. The fact is that millions of workers have
illusions in a government they regard as 'their own'. We
know the desire for change that surfaced at the elections
and was channeled through to the new administration will
sooner or later come up against an empty-handed reformism
-which will be unable to meet the deepest needs of labor
and the people. We have to stand by the working class and
the masses in their experience with Lula's government, fighting
for the political independence of the working class movement,
which is today chained to an alliance with its exploiters,
fighting as well for its organization along democratic lines
and winning them over to build a revolutionary proletarian
party.
NOTES
1
For most political commentators, the victory of Colonel
Gutiérrez in Ecuador is part and parcel of such international
influence. The same goes for the new lease of life given
to center-left quarters in Argentine politics, such as the
CTA (Argentine Workers Union Federation) and its leader,
Mr. Victor De Gennaro and Mrs. Elisa Carrió, amongst
others.
2 France Press, December 12, 2002
3 The alienation of the mass movement as an active protagonist
was a prerequisite for the PT finally getting into office.
The strong sway of the PT leadership, his ability to subordinate
its left wings, the control over whole swathes of the masses,
all these prevented the unions, for example, from launching
strikes and held back the landless peasants that tried to
occupy land for the whole run-up to the elections.
4 The PT governed many cities and states for a long time.
On top of that, the CUT holds the reins of the labor movement,
and the PT has strong links with the Catholic Church and
social movements active both in the cities and the countryside
-e.g., the MST. All these elements have turned the PT into
an actual option for the local bourgeoisie as a bulwark
to prevent the outbreak of a revolutionary crisis -a reliable
bulwark to weather the roughest political storm.
5 For example, in Venezuela, the masses defeated the abortive
April coup. After that, in the face of a renewed attempt
at a coup, the US has proposed a 'constitutional' solution
to work out the 'Chávez crisis' without direct confrontation.
Lula, in agreement with Bush, sent a 'personal envoy' to
deal with the crisis there, and seek an 'institutional solution'.
On January 2, after being sworn in, Lula met Chávez
in the capital, Brasilia, after sending in oil tankers loaded
with fuel to counter the scarcity in Venezuela. It is also
worth noting the importance attached by Lula to the South
American agenda in his inauguration speech of January 1,
2003 -given the preponderant role that Brazil might play
to help crisis-ridden countries out of the mire.
6 The prestige of reformism, mainly in Latin America, has
enabled it to defend bourgeois interest quite efficaciously.
The Lula-Alencar government will thus be of great value,
given the difficulties posed by the structural crisis affecting
capitalism. This, in turn, put them in position to push
ahead with a bitter medicine wrapped up in left-wing rhetoric,
hand in hand with 'social relief', workfare schemes, food
distribution and even a controlled hand-over of lands, housing,
cooperatives and the like -all of them combined with repression,
if necessary.
7 We have witnessed the 'incorporation' of the PT into the
ruling regime and the state apparatus for a whole period
of time now. Such process was boosted by the 1989-91 developments
on the world arena and the fierce capitalist offensive of
the 1990s, with strong repercussions worldwide. However,
this was a piecemeal process, i.e., there was first a 'molecular'
integration via parliamentary posts, the predominance of
union figures and professional policy-makers, etc. From
then on, a whole elite was co-opted; the entire upper echelons
in the leadership of the PT were 'incorporated'. Such process
started to unfold back in the mid-1980s, gaining momentum
in the 1990s in the heat of the political developments both
at home and abroad.
8 Das Capital, book 3, volume 7, p. 774, Siglo XXI Editores.
Marx makes here a reference to the circumstances in which
the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages was able to build
its hierarchy regardless of the social background, noble
origin or else personal wealth of its members, incorporating
those best gifted people among the populace, a mechanism
that was a key weapon to consolidate the power of the clergy
and to force the subordination of the lay state.
9 The outcome of the PT's 'incorporation' has been the 'rejuvenation
and preservation' of bourgeois rule. In order to do this,
something must 'be changed' so that everything remains the
same, a well-known move described in Giovanni di Lampedusa's
Il Gatopardo, also seen in the nineteenth-century Italian
Risorgimento. This came about in the wake of the wearing
out of the 'Washington Consensus', the unpopularity of 'neoliberal
plans' and the world economic crisis affecting capitalism.
To these we should add the dissatisfaction of the mass movement
that has fueled advanced phenomena with independent actions
as in Argentina, or in the last elections in Brazil. A 'change'
is necessary, i.e. to beautify the regime with the 'integration'
of the PT's upper echelons so everything remains the same,
staying away from any perspective of direct action by the
mass movement. It still remains to be seen if these changes
will remain in place.
10 Obviously, things are far from being settled yet in this
respect -whether such will be the final outcome will depend
on the performance of the present government, whether it
manages to weather the deep contradictions ahead or else
succumbs to them.
11 The practical result of the PT's 'incorporation' is that
it shares a responsibility for the smooth government of
the country, in tune with the 'common responsibility', as
Lula puts it, in order to keep law and order. We can say
that the bet is to stave off the crisis as a result of the
ability of the regime to 'incorporate' the upper echelons
of reformism, capitalizing on the illusions and aspirations
placed on the PT and Lula himself. By the same toke, the
socialdemocratic parties became passively integrated into
the bourgeois order, being hegemonized by capitalism and
the ruling class in the process. The state and the regime,
with their overpowering influence, managed to co-opt the
PT, not because its followers are 'incapable' of putting
forward a 'strategic alternative', as the Brazilian centrists
claim when considering that their policies are just wrong
-we would rather say they have been won over in heart and
mind for the continued existence of the regime.
12 A Sao Paulo-based journal, akin to those quarters, defines
the present government like this: 'This is a government
standing for production. The information sent to Washington
by the ambassador, Ms. Donna Hrinak, reports that the elect
president of Brazil claims he needs to trade with the USA
to satisfy, in the medium term, those entrepreneurs that
supported the PT's access to government. Standing against
some real obstacles, both the spin doctors and the policy
makers inside the PT in the foreign trade department deem
that it is the USA, rather than Europe or China and India,
the one that can help Lula's administration as quick as
possible to make good of a true obsession during the election
campaign: that this should be a government for production
and to mobilize the state with a view to job creation and
exports…This is at odds with the previous emphasis
on finance, which became the raison d'état for the
administration headed by Fernando Henrique Cardoso-Pedro
Malan'. Review Primera Lectura, December 2002.
13 Industrial Federation of the State of Sao Paulo
14 Interview on Folha do Sao Paulo, December 13, 2002.
15 He is referring to Lula's cabinet members
16 FIESP communiqué signed by its chairman, Mr. Horacio
Lafer Piva, in response to the appointment of Mr. Luiz Fernando
Furlan as Minister for Development, Industry and Trade.
17 Survey by the Getulio Vargas Foundation, made between
November 28 and December 2, circulated by the FIESP on December
17, 2002
18 Giving a precise characterization of the bourgeois quarters
is no easy thing, given the myriad of links between different
quarters. Quite often, the same figures are in outstanding
posts representing diverging interests. However, by and
large, we are able to distinguish separate quarters. There
is also an abundant Marxist literature dealing with this
issue.
19 The Finance Minister was recently questioned in an interview
vis-à-vis the continuity with past policies represented
by the appointment of Mr. Meirelles at the head of the Central
Bank. They asked him when the change would occur, and he
replied the following: 'The government of president Lula
has no need to put off the implementation of an agenda for
change, an economically sound model for a sustainable social
development. High rates of growth are hard to come by, especially
during the first year because we are going to tackle the
macroeconomic sphere with very big restrictions: a tight
budget, a monetary policy to fight against inflation and
a higher exchange rate. We can get started with some things,
though.' Interview published by Folha do Sao Paulo, December
22, 2002.
20 Interview published by Folha do Sao Paulo, December 18,
2002.
21 Mr. Horacio Lafer Piva, FIESP chairman; Mr. Alencar Burti,
chairman of the Trade Association of Sao Paulo; Mr. Gabriel
Jorge Ferreira, chairman of the Banks Federation (Febraban);
Mr. Paulo Skaf, chairman of the Brazilian Association of
Textile Industry (Abit); Mr. Luiz Fernando Furlan, CEO of
'Sadia'; Mr. Eugenio Staub, owner of the company Gradiente;
Mr. Abílio Diniz, CEO of the 'Pão de Açucar'
trust, just to name some of fat cats of the Brazilian bourgeoisie.
22 State of Sao Paulo
23 State of Sao Paulo interview, December 16, 2002
24 Antonio Gramsci, Notes on Macchiavelli, the State and
Politics, p. 52.
25 'Brazilian business is interested in the AFTA, but they
care above all that the country should have a strategy for
survival in case a stalemate comes. In the words of the
chairman of Brazil's Foreign Trade Association (AEB): 'I
can't let go of the biggest market in the world. The Embraer
corporation, for instance, sells as much as 25% of its production
in the US, and if that happens, it would just go bust'.
Snapping out of the stalemate in the increasingly muddled
America's Free Trade Association -AFTA- negotiations and
creating real alternatives to boost foreign trade are part
of the PT's promise that they would change the course of
the economic policy, switching from finance to production.'
Nueva Lectura Review, December 2002.
26 In his inauguration speech on January 1, Lula emphasized
that Brazil demands a seat in the UN Security Council.
27 State of Sao Paulo, December 17, 2002
28 Lula, as the November 22 New York Times editorial put
it 'might be an alternative alliance, neither a populist
nor a leftist one, that might endow the Bush administration
policy towards Latin America with some credibility.'
29 Clarín, December 11, 2002
30 Financial Times, December 12, 2002
31 'Lula's government can go for an in-between for such
bilateralism [a likely bilateral agreement between the US
and Brazil] On an official level, while not quitting the
AFTA negotiations, it will prioritize the negotiations to
reach an agreement of the MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay
and Paraguay) with the US, the so-called 4+1 scheme. And
this serves well the political interest of the PT: it makes
good of the promise to help the re-launch the ailing Common
Market of the South and goes in the direction of a bilateral
negotiation that will provide a trial run for the AFTA'.
Primera Lectura Review, December 2002.
32 The centrist parties have a share of responsibility in
this.
33 Mr. Henrique Meirelles stands accused of reaping illegal
benefits out of the devaluation of the Brazilian currency
in 1999, when he was serving at the Bank of Boston. New
York Times, December 22, 2002.
34 According to recent data, the company owned by Luiz Furlan
owes some 160 million dollars to the Bank for Social and
Economic Development (BNDES), which is part of the department
he presides. In the past, he was accused of renegotiating
loans for influential politicians on very favorable terms
for them. New York Times, December 22, 2002.
35 Mr. Roberto Rodríguez is currently being scrutinized
for the operation he carried out to get a 3.6 million dollars
loan for his department, when he was in charge of a state
administration some years ago. New York Times, December
22, 2002.
36 Mr. José Alencar has admitted that his textile
company, Brazil's second biggest, is being investigated
under allegations of fraudulent cotton purchases promoted
by the government. His son admits to having manipulated
the price of cotton to qualify for the subsidies handed
out by the government back then.
37 'The future Finance Minister, Mr. Antonio Palocci, stated
that the staffing of Lula's cabinet represents the opening
of a 'new phase that may seem odd for the PT, but that is
nevertheless a choice for production.' Último Segundo,
Transition, December 20, 2002.
38 The disagreements with the PMDB resulted in its exclusion
from government. However, the negotiations were tense, and
the door has been left open for the future participation
of this party in the administration.
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