Present perspectives for revolution and the dialectics
of 'freedom-liberation'
The realm of contemporary political theory is cut across
by a misleading antinomy opposing 'democracy' and 'totalitarianism'.
Such vulgar simplification schema glosses over the 150-year-long
record of the working class movement, putting an equal
sign between the whole past revolutionary experience of
the latter and the various hues of Stalinism.
The prevailing theories about 'democracy' today, in the
wake of the demise of Stalinist regimes almost everywhere,
rely on a liberal tenet advocating a wholesome separation
of politics with regards to any social determination, thus
introducing anew an unsurmountable antagonism between political
democracy and economic emancipation.
In her book On Revolution, Hanna Arendt pondered
the differences opposing the American and French revolutions
in the seventeenth century, charting that dicotomy by postulating
a gap between (political) 'liberty' and 'liberation' (ie,
social emancipation), which meant that the former did not
necessarily bring about the latter.
That abysmal gap emerged when taking into account the
'social issue' within a revolution, ie., the transformation
of poverty into an 'active social force' and the ensuing
need of working out the hardship that flowed from the economic
sphere through political tools. For H. Arendt, although
such emergence of the 'social question' -the 'burning needs
of the people'- was the distinctive feature of the 1789
French Revolution, and the Jacobine-sponsored period of
terror above all, it was actually Marx who eventually turned
'the social into the political'.
'Thus the goal of revolution was no longer to liberate
men from the oppression of their feloow men, let alone
to found freedom, but to liberate the life process of society
from the feeters of scarcity so that it could swell into
a streem ob abundance. Not freedom but abundance became
now the aim of revolution.'
H. Arendt's liberal views lead her, then, to gloss over
the fact that 'abundance' is a pre-requisite for freedom,
ignoring also that the contradiction is not one opposing
the social emancipation of the exploited and their political
self-determination, but that embedded within capitalist
relations of production themselves, which tie human beings
to the realm of need -with waged exploitation being the
ultimate denial of both liberation and liberty. It is here
that we find the most conservative thrust in H. Arendt´s
political views, which revolve around the idea of political
democracy as a form of self-government and constituent
power -ranging from the Greek polis to the revolutionary
workers' council in Russia 1917, Italy 1919 or Hungary
1956. Such view goes hand in hand with a pragmatical acceptance
of capitalism as such and an uncritical view of American
democracy -a beautification that was upheld by looking
at it according to the revolution from which it originated.
But whereas revolution still played a significant role
within the narrow liberal view of Arendt´s thought,
it is absolutely absent from the latest theoretical developments.
As Z. Bauman says, revealing the cynicism typical of present-day
pundits, the recent come-back of liberalism, beyond its
rethorical wrappings, 'boils down to a simple creed: «there
is no alternative»'.
Such radical separation of the social and political spheres
entails a theoretical codification of the break-up of the
dialectics between 'liberation and liberty' brought about
by the Stalinist degeneration of the USSR –which
was just made worse by the postwar revolutions. Moreover,
it writes revolution off the political horizon of postmodernism,
since in her view, revolution would always entail a denial
of freedom for the sake of an always dubious liberation.
The set of 'anti-totalitarian' thinkers ranges from 'postMarxists'
such as E. Laclau, who stand for a 'plural democracy' -a
strand that is just a vulgar re-run of Second International-styled
reformism sprinkled with a dash of psychoanalysis and liberalism,
as we shall see-; the advocates of 'counterpower' such
as J. Holloway who have jumped to the conclusion that if
the Russian workers' state degenerated we’d better
not dream of taking power ever again;
up to T. Negri, an 'immanent Communist' who is very enthusiastic
about the world as it is. He writes off political organization,
the transitional period and a workers' state altogether,
because he thinks the political has completely melted away
into the social sphere.
This ideological sleight-of-hand is topped off with a
'return' (to the Greeks, Locke, Kant, Spinoza, Bernstein...),
to some kind of 'preMarxism' adapted to 'postmodern' conditions,
on one hand, and an over-reliance on unilateral tendencies
rid of any kind of dialectical motion, on the other. And
this only leads them to mistify episodic situations, taking
them as if they were daily realities.
All the new thinkers in this strand of thought just 'ignore'
Trotsky, which is quite surprising when we consider that
many of them come from a Trotskyist background.
Such manoeuvre serves the purpose of portraying a caricature
of Marxism as a closed and deterministic schema quite well,
and thus 'prove' that the latter is conducive to totalitarianism,
putting an equal sign between Marxism and Stalinism. In
this way, they avoid confronting the contradictions flowing
from capitalism's social fabric, contenting themselves
with abstract truisms or else taking up old formulas that
have already been proved wrong by history.
In the face of such strategic and theoretical misery,
the thought of Leon Trotsky is a priceless legacy to re-enact
the perspective of proletarian revolution once again. It
serves also well to give the lie to those claiming a
priori -be it due to 'ontological' reasons or the
inherent human dynamics at work within any drive to political
organization- that seizing power and the attempt at building
a new society based on organs of working class power will
forcibly lead to totalitarian regimes.
It was Trotsky who reflected the most about these issues,
building upon the experience of the October Revolution
and the fight against its degeneration, anticipating even
the concept of totalitarianism and applying it to the Stalinist
regime (to which he denounced as 'a twin of Nazism'), a
long time before our liberals where ever able to come up
with a coherent explanation. He also waged a life and death
battle against Stalinism, upholding the perspective of
world revolution and soviet democracy against the juggernaut
of 'socialism in one country' and the bureaucratic dictatorship.
He saw it as the most democratic way of political organization
of the proletariat as a ruling class. That is why we believe
that his political and theoretical legacy today contains
valuable guidelines to come out of the conundrum opposing'freedom
without equality' to 'equality without freedom', and thus
rejuvenate revolutionary Marxism so that it becomes a revolutionary
beacon for workers power and workers democracy in the twenty
first century -pushing mankind out of its prehistory and
on to conquering a communist society.
'Plural democracy’ or
a return to Bernsterin?
The postmodern thinkers on democracy -be it plural, radical
or agonistic- have
replaced the great goal of emancipation from waged exploitation
with a vulgar return to old concepts of the liberal theory,
such as the 'universal values' of citinzenry and equality.
If, from a political standpoint, this leads to reformist
policies under the guise of 'radicalism', from a theoretical
point of view there is a striking parallel, in some fundamental
issues, with the debate within the Second International
in the late nineteenth century, which came to be known
as the 'Bernstein Debatte'.
When we look at Bernstein’s views, we can see that
many people, although they would not admit it, have taken
up several of his delusive 'insights' -on a crisis-free
capitalism, on the spread of democracy, etc. It is Ernesto
Laclau who recognizes his theoretical debt to the reformist
views of the Second International. He is one of the main
advocates of 'plural democracy', and we shall discuss with
him in the main.
It is very fruitful to contrast the original insights
flowing from Bernstein's reformism and those flowing from
Laclau's postMarxism. In doing so, we can see that beyond
the much vaunted theoretical sophistication churned out
by postestructuralism, psychoanalysis and linguistics,
it all boils down to a renewed attempt at writing off revolution,
replacing it by a piecemeal democratization of social life.
Reformism and the dynamics of capitalism
For Bernstein, the changes that occurred in the late nineteenth
century challenged the foundations of Marxism on all terrains:
the economy, the social dynamics of class, politics and
phylosophy. These rendered revolutionary strategy obsolete,
sparking off a move to substantiate, the ongoing political
intervention by whole sections of German social democracy
-its union and parliamentary fractions in the main- on
new political and programmatic bases. In his words, ‘the
influence of Social Democracy would be greatly enhanced
if it got rid of old-fashioned phraseology and decided
to come across as what it really is today: a socialist,
democratic party which stands for reform.’
What did Bernstein's proposed 'updating' of Marxism, aimed
at keeping its 'vitality', consist in? It just amounted
to writing it off altogether.
On the economic terrain, Bernstein aimed at the heart
of the Marxist theory: the theory of value and Marx’s
own account of capitalist crises. For Bernstein, the concepts
of 'absract labour' and 'value', were just mental set-ups,
theoretical generalizations that might be relevant tools
of analysis, but which bore no connection with the real
world.
He considered that Marx had highlighted those tendencies
leading to crises -essentially the tendency of the rate
of profit to fall and overproduction- but had glossed over
other tendencies, such as state intervention, the increasing
flexibility in the credit system, the expansion of the
world market, and the emergence of big trusts above all,
to which Bernstein endowed with an overriding power. And
he did so to the extent that he deemed unlikely 'the ocurrence
of general economic crises similar to previous ones, at
least for a long period of time'. Hence he concluded that
capitalism had been able to reconcile its tendency to uneven
development, setting in motion a course of endless progress,
which meant that 'class wars' no longer made sense, as
well as forcible revolution and the seizure of power by
the proletariat. Although reality has given the lie to
Bernstein a thousand times or more -we can just mention
the 1929 crack in passing- the perspective of a crisis-free
capitalism, even free from the business cycle, made a comeback
in the 1990s, with fresh ideology churned out by the champions
of 'globalization', who saw here an enduring tendency of
capitalism towards world integration. The same did the
advocates of the 'new economy' who also came up with the
theories about the end of work and the hegemony of immaterial
labour.
The quest of a reactionary utopia from Bernstein
to Laclau: citizenship, democracy and the state
It is in the realm of political definitions that the similarities
between Bernstein and the advocates of 'citizen's emancipation'
become mostly apparent. The latter stand for humanising
the most brutal tendencies of capitalism and expanding
the 'people's management' into the public sphere by taking
some resources and activities away from the private sector,
but without ever challenging private property.
Let us look how -in some fundamental respects- Bernstein
anticipated the high priests of postMarxist 'deconstruction',
who have gutted it out of the slightest reference to socialism,
to espouse the reform of capitalism. We shall also dwell
on the subsequent reply of classical Marxism to his postulates.
a) Democracy as a 'classless government'
In tune with his harmonious view of society, Bernstein
regarded the bourgeois democratic order and its state as
a 'superior form of civilization', one
in which class antagonism would continue to exist, becoming
less and less intense as time went by.
Opposing Marx and Engels' classical view of the state,
Bernstein considered that the new legislation passed, democratization
and the increasing social and political leverage of the
proletariat, had all radically altered the role of the
state as a class rule instrument, which had thereby become
a social organizer of 'all the people'. He stated that:'The
more the political institutions of modern nations become
democratized, the more the occasions and necessity for
great political crises are removed’,understanding
a 'political catastrophe' to be a violent proletarian upheaval
against the established order. Bernstein thus ruled out
revolution in the imperialist heartlands, even as a theoretical
probability.
Bernstein then asks himself 'what is the principle of
democracy?' And he replies: ‘We shall come much
nearer to the definition if we express ourselves negatively,
and define democracy as an absence of class government,
as the indication of a social condition where a political
privilege belongs to no one class as opposed to the whole
community. This negative definition has, besides, the advantage
that it gives less room than the phrase “government
by the people” to the idea of the oppression of the
individual by the majority which is absolutely repugnant
to the modern mind. The more it is adopted and governs
the general consciousness, the more will democracy be equal
in meaning to the highest possible degree of freedom for
all.
Democracy is in principle the suppression of class
government, though it is not yet the actual suppression
of classes.’
In tune with this neutral content, from the standpoint
of social antagonism at least, emancipation is no longer
regarded as emancipation from waged labour, as a platform
to achieve freedom. Instead, emancipation was to be achieved
by means of an enhanced citizenry, thus being deprived
of any class content whatsoever.
But formal democracy is not antagonical to capitalist
despotism -quite otherwise, it is the most stable judicial
framework for economic coercion, i.e. the forcible sale
of labour that is typical in the lives of the overwhelming
majority of mankind, because they have no other means of
life.
Although for different reasons, in
Laclau’s view, as well as in Bernstein’s, the
liberal political regime stands above the relations of
production that serve as its foundation.And
this leads to a simplistic view postulating both democracy
and the state as a neutral territory for the struggle to
win hegemony. Accordingly, the policies of the left 'do
not proceed along the lines of a direct assault onto the
state apparatus, but involve the consolidation and the
democratic reform of the liberal state.'
One need not resort to sophisticated schemas to dismiss
such scenario a utterly fantastic. Historically, bourgeois
democracy had been a luxury that only the most advanced
nations could afford. On the eve of World War II, Trotsky
pointed out that the democratic regime ‘is the most
aristocratic form of rule. Only rich nations can afford
it. Every single British democrat has nine or ten slaves
working in the colonies.’
But in the wake of World War II, matters were radically
altered. The United States was able to profit from the
Nazi’s barbarianism, the concentration camps and
the holocaust, as well as the oppressive and totalitarian
nature of the Stalinist regimes. Throughout the Cold War
the US made the ‘free world’ a by-word for ‘Western
democracy’ –in spite of having committed atrocities
such as the bombings of Dresden or the atomic bombing of
Nagasaki and Hiroshima, which would be continued in the
carnage of Vietnam and Algeria. For all its democratic
credentials, the US also backed the most vicious dictatorships
such as that of Suharto, the Apartheid in South Africa,
or the regimes of Pinochet in Chile and Videla in Argentina.
In the two last decades of the twentieth century, bourgeois
democracy spread to most of the semicolonial world and
the former Stalinist states, spawning regimes that combined
various degrees of Bonapartism and authoritarian traits.
However, such spread of liberal democracy has failed to
bring about social emancipation –quite otherwise
it has been a fig leaf for the neoliberal onslaught, providing
also a rationale for imperialist war elsewhere.
b) The atomisation of the proletariat
Bernstein considered that before claiming allegiance to
proletarian revolution, one should first furnish a definition
of what we understand the modern proletariat to
be. He replied that:‘If one counts in it all
persons without property, all those who have no income
from property or from a privileged position, then they
certainly form the absolute majority of the population
of advanced countries. But this “proletariat” would
be a mixture of extraordinarily different elements, of
classes which have more differences among themselves than
had the “people” of 1789 (...) the modern wage-earners
are not of the homogeneous mass, devoid in an equal degree
of property, family, etc., as the Communist Manifesto foresees.
In the most advanced of the manufacturing industries a
whole hierarchy of differentiated workmen are to be found
between whose groups only a moderate feeling of solidarity
exists.’
On top of the emergence of a labour aristocracy, Bernstein
also argued that the industrial working class, such as
Marx had conceived the proletariat, was a minority in society.
He pointed out to the emergence of agrarian classes and
also middle layers who had access to ownership of shares
and stocks. Those non proletarian classes did not –and
could not- develop a socialist consciousness. From this,
he concluded that although they might by and large share
a waged position, thus boosting union struggles in turn,
they would not reach agreement on a common agenda to run
the state once they had taken over it.
Right before Bernstein dwelled on this issue, Marx himself
had dealt with it –although not in a thorough-going
fashion- in his Critique of the Gotha Programme.
There, he focused on the oppressed, non proletarian, classes
and the policy that a revolutionary workers’ party
should raise towards the peasant and middle strata.
According to Laclau’s view, the prevailing social ‘atomisation’ of
today is a good enough pretext to proceed and ‘deconstruct’ the
concept of ‘class’. In fact, Laclau just ‘deconstructs’ the
concept of ‘working class’, but he does not
utter a single word as to the bourgeoisie itself has also
undergone ‘deconstruction’ –with private
property vanishing away altogether-, which speaks volumes
of how ideologically-biased his insights are.
Notwithstanding that, in order to be able to play out
the realm of politics, atomisation in itself or else sheer
difference are not enough. There must be a link between
such ‘moment of social plurality’ and that
of articulation. To work out this ever equivocal definition,
Laclau undertakes a re-writing of the concept of ‘hegemony’ from
his post-structuralist perspective. The latter was forged
by Russian Marxists and developed by the Comintern, but
Laclau proceeds to gut it out of any class content whatsoever,
turning it into an ‘empty signifier’. The rival
social subjects agonize to endow it with a particular meaning,
one with universal effects for other social subjects, which
enacts, through a chain of equivalent values, the opening
of the field of politics.
Laclau regards Marxism as an ‘essentialist’ and ‘objectivistic’ theory.
However, he is forced to acknowledge that the law of uneven
and combined development and the theory of permanent revolution,
such as it was originally postulated in 1904-05 and then
codified by Trotsky in the late 1920s, broke with mechanistic
determinism. It alsp ushered in a perspective of proletarian
hegemony vis-à-vis bourgeois –i.e. democratic-
tasks. But then Laclau
goes on to say that Trotsky’s political mindset was
still tied up to ‘class-ridden essentialism’.
Indeed, Trotsky considered that the fact that the proletariat
should take over those tasks a declining bourgeoisie was
unwilling to carry out did not result in a changed nature
of the tasks themselves, nor did the identity of the working
class change accordingly –the latter remained the
social subject who would make good of them as part of its
own revolution.
Instead of Laclau’s interpretation of the concept
of ‘hegemony’ as devoid of any class content,
the tradition of Russian Marxism and the Comintern, including
Gramsci, claimed that hegemony made sense as long as society
was divided into classes, because such concept set out
those classes on which the proletariat was to enforce its
dictatorship and those on which hegemony would be exerted.
In the years before the Russian Revolution, the discussion
revolving around working class hegemony was focused on
the role played by the proletariat in the fight against
the Tsarist autocracy. The former implied that the working
class should win the poor peasants over to their side as
an ally, which entailed reaching practical compromise with
regards to non-socialist tasks of the revolution such as
the land reform. Such hegemony over the oppressed strata
was something different from the dictatorship enforced
against class enemies such as the autocracy and the liberal
bourgeoisie, whose power and state were to be forcibly
suppressed.
For a former socialist, now recycled as liberal, such
as Laclau, that postulate, along with that of a revolutionary
party, stands accused of having nourished what he brands ‘authoritarian
practices’. Such a definition, he claims, is a
priori, i.e., it sets before the political
act, the class sense of a given demand, targeting a specific
social agency for change.
Trotsky made theoretical room for the increasingly heterogeneous
nature both of society and the proletariat in his concept
of uneven and combined development -and also in his theory
of permanent revolution. He argued for the need to uphold
proletarian hegemony at the head of the exploited, advocating
a transitional programme to weld together the various strata
and layers of the working class.
Today, in the wake of the neoliberal onslaught that brought
about an increased atomisation of the working class, but
also a widespread reign of waged relationships, Trotsky’s
insights are priceless when it comes to overcoming the
prevalent divisions within the working class –organized
labour, the jobless, casual labour, temps, etc-, thus telescoping
social diversity and democratic demands into a single anticapitalist
perspective, one suitable to raise a revolutionary policy.
c) A universal citizenry
Bernstein came to the conclusion that the dictatorship
of the proletariat had been suitable for a time long gone
then, in which the propertied classes had a tight grip
on power across Europe, a situation that both capitalist
development and the parliamentary achievements of social
democracy had rendered obsolete. He states:
‘Is there any sense, for example, in maintaining
the phrase of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” at
a time when in all possible places representatives of
social democracy have placed themselves practically in
the arena of Parliamentary work, have declared for the
proportional representation of the people, and for direct
legislation – all of which is inconsistent with
a dictatorship.
The phrase is to-day so antiquated that it is only
to be reconciled with reality by stripping the word dictatorship
of its actual meaning and attaching to it some kind of
weakened interpretation. The whole practical activity
of social democracy is directed towards creating circumstances
and conditions which shall render possible and secure
a transition (free from convulsive outbursts) of the
modern social order into a higher one. From the consciousness
of being the pioneers of a higher civilisation, its adherents
are ever creating fresh inspiration and zeal. In this
rests also, finally, the moral justification of the socialist
expropriation towards which they aspire. But the “dictatorship
of the classes” belongs to a lower civilisation.’
Proletarian revolution was no longer the goal of social
democracy, being replaced by that of enhancing citizenry. ‘On
the contrary, social democracy does not wish to break up
this society and make all its members proletarians together;
it labours rather incessantly at raising the worker from
the social position of a proletarian to that of a citizen,
and thus to make citizenship universal.’
Although he recognized that liberal parties had become ‘a
bulwark for capitalism’, Bernstein believed that ‘socialism
is a legitimate heir of liberalism’, and this not
only in the short run, but in its ‘spiritual qualities’,
to the extent that he considered socialism could summarily
be described as ‘organised liberalism’.
Ultimately, he considered that both the parliamentarian
regime and the state would progressively smooth out conflict
between rival classes, to the extent that its main source
of origin would be removed altogether, therefore overcoming
the contradiction opposing ‘political equality’ to ‘social
inequality’.
However, it is precisely here where the strength of capitalism
lied and still lies; i.e., an appalling 'social inequality'
predicated upon the exploitation and social coercion of
the overwhelming majority of the population, who has been
deprived of all means of production, coexists alongside
the fullest 'juridical equality'. This misleads the people
into believing that all individual citizens -regardless
of their social position- are regarded as equal by the
state, with the same level of political entitlement and
obligation.
But capitalist exploitation is no juridical problem -nor
does it fade away by means of law reform. As Rosa Luxemburg
replied to him, ‘No law obliges the
proletariat to submit itself to the yoke of capitalism.
Poverty, the lack of means of production, obliges the proletariat
to submit itself to the yoke of capitalism.’
Unlike Bernstein, Luxemburg believed that the modern democratic
representative state was not -and is not- a 'superior form
of civilization', but rather it embodies a dictatorship
of capital despotically presiding over the mass of wage-earners,
regardless of any formal political rights conceded to the
latter.
Laclau does not believe -as Bernstein did- that the present
world is a 'superior civilization', but he does believe
it is the only democratic order possible, one that makes
room for all differences (sexual, ethnic ones, etc) to
be recognized.
In order to contrast such 'democracy' reliant on contingent
identities, Laclau makes a mishmash between a transitional
society and the future communist world society -to which
Marx referred to as a society free from those class antagonisms
typical of human prehistory- and comes up with a deterministic
and 'totalitarian' portrait of Marxism. Furthermore, he
considers social revolution as akin to the end of politics,
therefore giving rise to a seamless and transparent society.
d) A return to Kant
Bernstein wrote off dialectics altogether because he believed
that its emphasis on the 'fight of opposites' not only
distorted reality, portraying conflict worse than it really
was, but also gave bogus credentials to the need for a
forcible revolution. This negative view on dialectics led
him to claim that Marxism's core should lie in evolution,
with its moral thrust being some kind of neoKantism. Socialism,
henceforth deprived of any scientific foundation in the
dynamics of capitalism's contradictions themselves, went
on to become an ethical pursuit or a 'regulating idea',
to be freely chosen for by human will. The advance of that
supposedly 'higher civilization' represented by democracy
in the advanced countries, heralded the promise of 'perpetual
peace', as promised by Kant, a gross blunder that was proved
wrong by the antagonisms that sparked off World War I.
Bernstein postulated a dualism made up of the 'natural
need' of capitalist economic laws and the 'ethical freedom'
that went into the choice for socialism. Evolutionarism
has been greatly discredited ever since, having been virtually
rejected by most contemporary theories. But the 'return
to Kant' still lingers on in the minds of many leftists,
who have reintroduced a sort of dualism made up of present-day
conditions on one hand, and an out-of-reach ethical goal
on the other. Some vestiges of such dualistic view can
be found in Derrida's promise of the 'incoming democracy'
and his messianic stand-by attitude. Taking issue with
Laclau, Slavoj Zizek argues that 'Laclau's main Kantian
thrust lies in his acceptance of the insurmountable gap
between the enthusiasm of an impossible Pursuit of political
compromise and its more modest, achievable content.' In
a nutshell, this means we should uphold the promise of
a 'radical democracy' and a new hegemony, while partial
reforms within the framework of representative liberal
democracy are achieved.
Contemporary political philosophy tends to dismiss both
dialectics and historical materialism as negative views,
as well-rounded forms of totalitarianism, overriding singularity
and ultimately advocating what Derrida called a 'metaphysics
of presence', namely, the illusion of finding an objective
foundation that should render reality , i.e. society, understandable
to the subject. Instead of this, it places great emphasis
on antagonism. But such philosophies of contingency have
just given a fresh breath of life to old-styled essentialism,
an archaic metaphysics and an even more archaic vitalism.
Far from rendering the dynamics of societal motion and
change more clear, they just relapse into renewed philosophical
idealism and political utopias.
The parallel we have summarily developed so far sheds
light -we believe- on the profoundly ideological bias of
those theories standing on similar grounds as Bernstein's
-and by ideological we mean misleading and contrived. When
Bernstein put forward his reformist ideas, the working
class was conquering key gains, with an increasing social
and political weight achieved through elections and increasing
seats in the parliament. The advance of capitalism, in
turn, fostered the illusion of ceaseless progress and an
increasing harmony between the states.
Such rosy picture is hard to believe now, once the twentieth
century has ended, a century cut across by slumps, two
devastating world wars and the emergence of social revolution.
The kind of political reformism advocated by 'plural democracy'
cannot stand today. The neoliberal onslaught, which delivered
a harsh blow to the living conditions of the masses worldwide,
is proof positive that a harsh economic and social counter-revolution
can unfold within a democratic institutional framework.
In the words of Lenin, democracy has once again proved
to be 'the best wrapping for the dictatorship of capital',
with proletarian revolution remaining the only viable way
of taking on bourgeois power successfully.
The dicatorship of the proletarid as a mass democracy.
The debate today
We have referred above to the so-called post Marxist theory
advocating a ‘radical democracy’ and reformist
policies, which are by and large the offspring of Bernstein’s
strand of Marxism within the Second International.
But the lure of ‘radical democracy’ extends
farther than intellectual circles. It has had a serious
impact on those strands of the left claiming allegiance
to revolutionary Marxism, such as the French Revolutionary
Communist League,
which ditched the formula ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ out
of its programme at its last congress.
The European press has drawn a parallel with the French
Communist Party's ‘abandonment of the dictatorship
of the proletariat’ back in 1976, thus hinting that
if this inaugurated the French CP’s turn to eurocommunism,
the LCR today has embarked on a turn with similar consequences
within the Trotskyist movement. That
is why a debate on this topic is an urgent task –still
more so when we consider that this party has outstanding
Marxist intellectuals within it.
The fact that the LCR has ditched the dictatorship of
the proletariat is no mere terminological or ‘discoursive’ matter,
as their leaders claim, alleging that the word ‘dictatorship’ has
an undeniably negative overtone in the eyes of the mass
movement. Instead, such move represents the programmatic
culmination of a long-term political and theoretical endeavour
on the part of the LCR –especially after the events
of 1989- which seeks to blur the line separating reform
and revolution.
Just for the sake of giving some recent examples, let
us mention that the LCR has adapted to the reformist wing
of World Social Forum, including organizations like ATTAC.
Back in 2002, they even called to vote for the right-wing
French president, Mr. Chirac to stop the rise of arch-rightwing
candidate Le Pen, advocating the defense of the republic.
The most extreme case of adaptation is represented by Democracia
Socialista –the LCR’s Brazilian sister organization-,
one of whose main leaders serves as a minister for Lula’s
capitalist government.
This debate, then, seeks to show how post Marxist –and
left liberal- views have shaped the political course followed
by the LCR. Those views abhor the concept of class, postulating
instead that of citizenry, and collapse the perspective
of revolution into that of a radicalization of democracy.
This shows through in a recently-proclaimed formulation
of revolution, which in the words of one of their leaders,
has come to mean ‘a struggle for democracy through
and through’. Moreover, universal suffrage, rather
than a democracy based on workers’ councils, has
been proclaimed the organizing principle within a transitional
society to socialism.
We shall start our debate by summarily charting the origin
and evolution of the concept ‘dictatorship of the
proletariat’.
The dictatorship of the proletariat,
a democracy of workers’ council and the withering
away of the state
After years of unchallenged Stalinist rule, the dictatorship
of the proletariat came to be regarded as tantamount to
the dictatorship of a single party. This fallacy makes
it all the more necessary to restore its original significance
for revolutionary theory, one which –as we shall
see- is closely associated with a democracy for the majority
and the withering away of the state.
In the tradition of revolutionary Marxism, the dictatorship
of the proletariat is a byword for a new kind of democracy;
proletarian democracy based on organs of mass self-determination,
and this is true of its two aspects: either we regard it
as a ‘strategic task’, i.e. one that is not
posed right now as a practical undertaking, like Marx in
the face of the Paris Commune, or else as a concrete form
of organization within post capitalist societies, one tending
to the withering away of the state.
In his Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx
furnishes the most concrete definition on how ‘the
working class as a ruling class’ will eventually
get organized. Here, he traces a clear distinction between
a transitional period spanning between the overthrow of
the bourgeoisie and its state on one hand, and the advent
of a communist society on the other, branding that transitional
state-regime the ‘revolutionary dictatorship of the
proletariat’.
Such transitional period, which Marx defined as the ‘first
phase of communist society’, does not amount to a ‘realm
of liberty’. The economic organization is still presided
over by an apparent equalization of unequal individuals,
with bourgeois rights still reigning supreme, and each
individual member is given according to what society provides.As
Marx explains, ‘Right can never stand above the
economic structure of society and the cultural development
impinging on it’. In this communist perspective,
the state that stood as the organization of the proletariat
as a ruling class seeking to reorganize society after the
expropriation of the bourgeoisie -and the collective ownership
of the means of production-, was henceforth doomed to wither
away, along with class antagonism.
Basing himself on such definition of a transitional state
forged by Marx, one that enshrines the embryonic forms
of its ultimate extinction, Lenin was to develop his view
around a ‘proletarian semi-state’ –charted
in his State and Revolution. Such state was bound
to emerge after the overthrow of bourgeois rule. Lenin
sets out to show how the advance of technique achieved
by capitalism, combined with a cultural break-through for
the masses, would pave the way for a simpler ‘book-keeping
and accounting’ –two major assingments of the
state- therefore empowering most workers to enact their
own administration. In Lenin’s view, a shortened
working day, itself the result of a democratic planning
of the economy, a radically democratic programme –implemented
by recallable and accountable officials-, the elimination
of material privilege and the widespread arming of the
population, would all push the state towards its own extinction.
But it was Trotsky who, since the 1905 Russian Revolution,
hammered out the future paths to workers power more clearly,
by pointing to the role of the soviets as embryonic state
organs that would come to rule for the duration of the
transitional period. In his “Conclusions of 1905”,
he states, ‘The soviet organized the bulk of
the working class, led strikes and protests, armed the
workers and protected the population against pogroms (...)
If the proletariat, on their own behalf, and the reactionary
press, for its part, both branded the soviet as a ‘proletarian
government’, it was because such organization was
indeed no other thing than an embryonic revolutionary government
(...) In becoming a rallying platform for the revolutionary
forces of the nation, the soviet did not dissolve itself
in revolutionary democracy; it was the organized reflection
of the class will of the proletariat, and remained so.’
This far-sighted observation made by Trotsky on the role
the organs of mass self-determination were bound to play
from the emergence of the Petrograd soviet onwards, was
proved right all along the way in the February Revolution
of 1917, which ushered in a dual power regime. Such role
of the soviets as a ‘ultimately found’ basis
for a new proletarian state was codified into the Bolshevik
slogan of ‘all power to the soviets’, which
culminated to the victorious October Revolution in 1917.
According to the historian E.H. Carr, ‘The concept
of a dictatorship of the proletariat, applied by the
Bolsheviks to the regime established by them in Russia
after the October revolution, did not bear any specific
constitutional implications whatsoever (...) The emotional
overtones of the word «dictatorship», insofar
as it was associated with the idea of a rule of the few,
was totally absent from the minds of the Marxists who
resorted to that phrase. Quite otherwise, the dictatorship
of the proletariat would be the first regime in history
in which power was to be exerted by the class who made
up the majority of the population, a condition that should
be met in Russia by drawing the mass of peasants into
an alliance with the industrial proletariat (...) Far
from being the rule of violence, it would pave the way
for the elimination of the resort to violence as a social
punishment, i.e., for the withering away of the state.’ Such
endeavour failed to materialize, because shortly after
the seizure of power the civil war broke out, forcing
the Bolsheviks to enforce exceptionally harsh measures
which resulted in a reinforced centralization of political
and military powers in the hands of the state –and
the Bolshevik leadership- to defend the revolution. However,
the prevailing view today glosses over those first days
of the revolution, highlighting instead the drift towards
bureaucratic degeneration. As F. Ollivier correctly points
out, ‘the Stalinists resorted to the dictatorship
of the proletariat as a rationale to wipe out the slightest
trace of democratic life within the Russian working class
and society.’
Marxist theory was degraded to a vulgar mechanistic determinism,
and the dictatorship of the proletariat, in turn, was regarded
as tantamount to the dictatorship of a single party presiding
over the state and politics in a monopolistic fashion.
The
LCR and the struggle for ‘democracy
through and through’
In the debate around the book Révolution! 100
mots pour changer le monde de O. Besancenot,
A. Artous poses that their new definition of revolution
could be summed up as a ‘struggle for democracy
through and through’, ‘not any kind
of democracy, but one whose foundation is universal suffrage’.
And he goes on to say, ‘if we are to talk about
what is new in this book compared with the past traditions
of the League,
we should say, in a nutshell, that we are dropping the
general questions of «democracy of workers’ councils» (or
soviet democracy) for the sake of a democracy whose foundation
is universal suffrage, even when –of course- the
former does not boil down to such principle’.
In a transitional society it would be ‘a democracy
organized around national, regional and local assemblies,
elected through universal and proportional suffrage -one
really representing the citizens and producers.’
In order to avoid some ‘corporative’ traits
that would come in with a democracy based on productive
units, Artous goes on to say that ‘we have to
imagine a democracy operating on the basis of a double
system of representation: one based on the election of
citizens through universal suffrage, the other tending
to represent the «socio-economic» point of
view of wage-earners and the wide layers making up the
overwhelming majority of the population. Without going
into detail (quite complicated ones, which also vary depending
on the context) about this second type of representation,
one could possibly imagine a dual system of assembly. But
should conflict arise, it should be known who takes the
decisions. And this can only be done on the basis of each
citizen's individual vote, namely through universal suffrage
as such -a referendum for example.'
To depict revolution as a 'struggle for democracy through
and through' obviously sows illusions to the effect that
social conflict and class antagonism can both be worked
out by radicalising the ways of democracy. In doing so,
not only does the LCR downplay the central role of the
working class in the struggle against the bourgeoisie,
but the very idea of revolution as the sharpest reflection
of class combat as well.
The LCR thus seems to have seized upon the conclusion
drawn by E. Laclau twenty years ago in his book Hegemony
and Socialist Strategy, in which he regarded 'socialism'
as a mere feature of 'democratic revolution'.
Revolutionary Marxists raise democratic demands within
the mass movement, including formal democratic ones, as
long as they remain a key driving force, to fight back
a capitalist state that increasingly curtails liberties.
But they do so with the aim of transcending the narrow
limits of mean-spirited bourgeois democracy, which seeks
to hide its class nature behind a fake pretense to formal
political equality. In this way, we seek to draw the mass
movement closer to a new kind of democracy, one built on
mass organs of self-determination which shall 'herald the
features of the future society', as the LCR likes to put
it, or else become an embryonic workers power, along the
lines of Trotsky's insights vis-à-vis the soviets
back in 1905.
However, there is no capitalist society that can democratically
grow into a socialist society unless the bourgeois state
is smashed, a cornerstone that the LCR seems to have dropped
altogether.
The LCR seems also oblivious to the fact that all revolutionary
struggles tend to outdo those bourgeois democratic forms
of representation -and this precisely because the former
call forth a new constituent power that cannot be achieved
through the same old ways of the constituted power they
seek to overthrow. The role of councils as a revolutionary
expression of a mass constituent power was even reckoned
by liberal thinkers such as H. Arendt. She says: 'since
the eighteenth century revolutions, all great upheavals
have spawned a rudimentary new form of government, one
which emerged independently from previously existing revolutionary
theories, directly from the course of revolution itself,
namely the experiences of action and the ensuing will of
the participants to take over the further evolution of
public affairs. This new form of government is a system
of councils.'
Moreover, the LCR seems to imagine a transitional society
in which, once the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, the
social classes will wither away and the menace of counterrevolution
along with them, both at home and abroad. Hence, both the
pivotal role of the working class and its soviet-styled
organization to defend the revolution can be disposed of.
But the truth is that social classes do exist within a
transitional society, with the seizure of power just exacerbating
all existing contradictions. The workers state, then, will
surely have to defend itself against reaction at home and
the eventual assault from abroad as well. That is why the
system of 'dual representation' advocated by the LCR writes
off the dictatorship of the proletariat altogether. In
it, the working class is assimilated and fragmented into
the citizenry, and should a 'clash of interests' arise
-in a transitional state all 'clashes of interests' have
to do with resisting counterrevolution- this would supposedly
work itself out naturally through bourgeois procedures
such as the universal suffrage.
Furthermore, the measures of 'direct democracy' that the
LCR stands for, such as universal suffrage and referendums,
far from being a bulwark against bureaucratization, are
instruments usually resorted to by plebiscitary Bonapartist
regimes. At the time when the Moscow Trials were in full
swing, Stalin himself had universal suffrage as an 'election
principle' included in the Soviet constitution of 1936,
after having crushed soviet democracy through counterrevolution.
In this regard, Trotsky noted that the Stalinist constitution
'differs from the old one in that it replaces the soviet
election system, relying on class and production units,
by that of bourgeois democracy, based on the so-called
'direct and equal universal suffrage' of an atomized population.
In short, we are faced here with a juridical elimination
of the dictatorship of the proletariat.'
The future democracy based on 'universal suffrage' advocated
by the LCR, and the so-called 'combined forms of representation'
actually entail doing away with a soviet-styled way of
representation, the one through which the working class
should rule as a hegemonic class.
Indeed, such 'system' advocated by the LCR -one based
on 'regional and local assemblies'- is no transitional
regime to socialism. We have had an anticipation of what
the future society might amount to in the experiment around
'participative democracy' and the 'participative budget'
carried out by their sister organization in Porto Alegre,
Brazil. What Daniel Bensaid considers to be some sort of
'institutional dual power' is
no other thing that the same old adaptation to a prevailing
atmosphere of possibilism and open reformist practices
on a municipal level -which so far has left the power of
the capitalists intact. It has thus shown that such 'radical
democracy' is not conducive to social revolution if it
stops 'at the threshold of property'.
Citizens or producers?
Going back to the question of the relationship between
political and social emancipation, A. Artous takes in Arendt's
total separation of the political sphere and proceeds to
include it into a Marxist theoretical framework, therefore
adopting the idea that freedom would ultimately be achieved
by means of enhancing the political rights of citizens.
In the conclusions at the end of his book Marx, l'Etat
et la politique, he claims that we cannot think
of 'the relation between political emancipation and social
emancipation along the lines of a mere chronologically
successive order, with the latter enacted by the former,
which then translates into the elimination of all kinds
of political order. Political emancipation is no mere
phase of modern history, but an endlessly repeated moment,
-since it is endlessly challenged- of the establishment
of the social on a democratic basis.'
Artous then points out that Marx 'underestimated the juridical
moment of emancipation', taking up Etienne Balibar's political
theory, especially the latter's idea of 'egaliberté',
understood as an (apparently) universal feature, as equality
in principle of all human beings due to the fact that they
are speaking beings, or better still, as an unconditional-impossible-infinite
demand of freedom and equality that has the potential of
blowing up the established order of state power.
In a later work,
A. Artous advocates a dualism between the 'producer' and
the 'citizen'. Although he makes clear that he approaches
economic emancipation as a prerequisite for political emancipation,
which deprives 'citizenship' of the intrinsic reference
to formal equality under capitalism, such dualism opposing
the 'producer to the citizen' is predicated upon a break-up
between economic democracy and political democracy
In his view, soviet democracy as a democracy of producers,
would run the risk of collapsing 'the economy into politics',
thus thwarting the scope of liberty. And this because his
theory postulates that state-run production keeps the separation
of direct producers from the means of production in place.
In turn, this inevitably leads to an autonomous sphere
of production planning that might spawn a new kind of domination. This
inexorably leads him to state that the dictatorship of
the proletariat -not the Stalinist juggernaut- fosters
the germs of what might turn into a totalitarian regime.
There is no doubt that labor is not 'free' within a transitional
society, and still remains under the tutelage of a bogus
equality hinged upon bourgeois right. But that does not
necessarily entail the consolidation of a 'bureaucracy
of knowledge'.
Artous seems to take for granted that democracy is bound
to 'stay out of the factories', with little or no possibilities
of a democratic planning of the economy, considering that
the emergence of a bureaucracy linked to production is,
to a certain extent, inevitable.
Trotsky, instead, regarded soviet democracy as closely
intertwined to economic democracy. In his Revolution
Betrayed he foresaw the debacle of the Stalinist states
with many decades of anticipation, when he stated that 'In
a nationalized economy, quality needs of a democracy based
on producers and consumers, freedom to criticize and propose
initiatives, things which are incompatible with a totalitarian
regime relying on fear, deception and adulation (…)
Soviet democracy is no abstract or moral demand. It has
become a life and death question for the country.'
Artous, instead, thinks that making citizenship independent
from the sphere of production is the way to enact political
rights. From this point of view, he proceeds to criticize
the 1918 Russian constitution, because although it introduced
a concept of citizenship which did not exist under Tsarism,
giving 'equal rights to all citizens, regardless of
their race or nationality', the former is predicated
upon 'social status rather the right of men in general'.
And he concludes: 'To say that citizenship is an atribute
of a person and not a given social group of wage-earners
or producers, is to repeat in other words that it is also
necessary to become free of labour (...) is to reassure
that the main goal of emancipation is to put politics on
top of the agenda -i.e., the advent of a particular dimension
of the social, which trascends the sphere of need and allows
people to live together.'
Artous, then, conceptualizes politics following H. Arendt,
understanding it to be a space for 'being together'. But
outside a society completely freed from the 'realm of need'
-i.e., communism- men 'cannot live together' beyond 'the
sphere of need' just by resorting to political means. Trotsky
clearly pointed out how the Stalinist bureaucracy had deep
roots in the 'sphere of need', which abounded in backward
Russia. And this made democratic planning all the more
necessary, as well as an international strategy for revolution.
Class, soviets and the party
'Anti-essentialist' views, basing themselves on the Stalinist
juggernaut, accuse Marxism of postulating a seamless and
univocal correspondance between the proletariat as a social
subject and its political representation, which would in
turn lead to a 'single party dictatorship'.
But this is an absurd claim. Classical Marxism historically
set out a complex relationship between the class and the
revolutionary party, codifying the most outstanding experiences
of the proletariat into a thoretical framework. Stalinism
made a mock of such relationship. Marx´s theory on
the party always hinged upon the transition from 'class
in itself' to 'class for itself'.In
the Communist Manifesto, he stated that the 'organization
of the proletariat as a class' was tantamount to the latter's
'organization in a political party', which meant that class
struggle thus became a political struggle waged by the
'proletarian party' against the 'party of the bourgeoisie'.
In this sense, “The Communists do not form a separate
party opposed to other working class parties. They have
no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat
as a whole.(…) The Communists are distinguished
from the other working class parties by this only: in the
national struggles of the proletarians of the different
countires, they point out and bring to the front the common
interests of the entire proletariat independently of all
nationalities (…) in the various stages of development
which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie
has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent
the interests of the movement as a whole” .
The Communists, then, made up the 'most resolute section'
of the working class parties.
It is in this regard -the idea of a continuity between
the fights of the toiling masses and their political becoming-
that Lenin came up with an 'innovation', as Artous calls
it, with his theory of the political party formulated in
his What is to be Done? Although this pamphlet
drafted in 1902 still remains the subject of a lot of controversy,
we shall not dwell on the various issues arising from it,
just focusing on Lenin´s main insights. We should
first say that, in his view, no organic continuity between
economic fights and political struggles existed. Moreover,
Lenin argued that no seamless or mechanic relationship
exists between the working class as a whole and its political
agencies. This shows through in Lenin´s reckless
fight against economism, against which he insisted that
socialism in no way flowed spontaneously from the class
struggle -quite otherwise he insisted that the proletariat's
spontaneous ideology was a syndicalist and thus a bourgeois
one. And for this an organization rallying the most conscientious
elements of the working class and the intelligentsia was
needed. Such organization was to stand politically autonomous
with regards to the class as a whole and its institutions
for economic fight, one professionally committed to revolution.
He thus broke free from a piecemeal and linear view of
the party, more akin to that of German social democracy,
in which the revolutionary party was meant to encompass
other class institutions such as the unions within it.
In spite of the fact that Lenin's view in 1902 did not
furnish a correct relationship between the self-activity
of the masses on one hand, and the party on the other,
the 1905 revolution enabled him to work out this issue
and get ready to struggle for workers power. Shortly after
the upheaval in Saint Petersburg, arguing against some
incorrect views held by the Bolshevik Party on the issue
of soviets, Lenin wrote: ‘It seems to
me that Comrade Radin is wrong in raising the question:
the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies or the Party? I think
that it is wrong to put the question in this way and that
the decision must certainly be: both the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies
and the Party.’ How did Lenin regard this relationship?
In his view, the soviet was the widest organ of mass united
front and 'gathered all the truly revolutionary forces'.It
was not an 'appendix of social democracy' and the latter
was no substitute for the soviet. The task of the party
was to fight for the leadership and proletarian hegemony
within it.
In tune with his remarks of 1905, Lenin finally adopts
the following scheme: 'the dictatorship is presided
over by the proletariat organized in soviets and led by
the Bolshevik communist party'.
Lenin was thus a pioneer who broke with the prevailing
view within social democracy at that time -one that put
an equal sign between the party and the class. However,
it was left to Trotskyto
furnish a well-rounded dialectical view on the relationship
linking the different sections of the working class, the
mass organs for united front, the leading role of the revolutionary
party -before and after the seizure of power- and a multi-party
regime of soviet democracy as the cornerstone of the dictatorship
of the proletariat.
In his Revolution Betrayed, Trotsky goes on to
claim that the ban imposed on the SRite and Menshevik parties
and the ensuing ban on fractions within the Bolshevik Party
were not free from political consequences. But what the
Bolshevik government regarded as a 'provisional measure
dictated by the needs of the civil war, the blockade, foreign
intervention and hunger'',Stalin
turned into a dictum, putting an equal sign between the
class and the party. Thus, the one party regime was predicated
upon an silogism -i.e. the classes have withered away and
so have the parties. Trotsky, instead, thought that the
seizure of power in itself did not entail the abolition
of existing classes altogether. He stated that: ‘In
reality classes are heterogeneous; they are torn by inner
antagonisms, and arrive at the solution of common problems
no otherwise than through an inner struggle of tendencies,
groups and parties. It is possible, with certain qualifications,
to concede that "a party is part of a class." But
since a class has many "parts”—some look
forward and some back—one and the same class may
create several parties. For the same reason one party may
rest upon parts of different classes. An example of only
one party corresponding to one class is not to be found
in the whole course of political history—provided,
of course, you do not take the police appearance for the
reality.’And he concludes: ‘From
his [Stalin’s]reasonings it follows not
only that there can be no different parties in the Soviet
Union, but that there cannot even be one party. For where
there are no classes, there is in general no place for
politics.’
Hence, Trotsky hammered out the idea of soviet multipartisanship
as a programmatic norm. In the Transitional Programme,
he states that ‘The bureaucracy replaced
the soviets as class organs with the fiction of universal
electoral rights—in the style of Hitler-Goebbels.
It is necessary to return to the soviets not only their
free democratic form but also their class content. As once
the bourgeoisie and kulaks were not permitted to enter
the soviets, so now it is necessary to drive the bureaucracy
and the new aristocracy out of the soviets.
Democratization of the soviets is impossible without legalization
of soviet parties. The workers and peasants themselves
by their own free vote will indicate what parties they
recognize as soviet parties.’
Artous correctly points out that Trotsky was 'the
only Marxist leader of the Russian revolution to hammer
it [Soviet multipartisanship] in the inter-war years',
a view which he deems a very surprising one, since 'Gramsci's
reflection, as Perry Anderson noted, on the war of position
(...) goes hand in hand with a greatly reinforced authoritarian
view on the party'. Trotsky's insights, which flow
from social stratification, not only applies to the political
regime within a post-capitalist society. Artous notes
that 'Trotsky's insights on multipartisanship are
then not only the fruit of a reflection concerning the
evolution of the USSR alone, but they also have to do
with his reflection concerning the strategic perspectives
for the fight for power in Western European countries'.
But, be it in a capitalist society or else in a transitional
one, the activity of various parties within the soviets,
or in organs of the working class and the people, does
not imply, in any way, that the revolutionary party should
renounce to fight for the leadership, going for a consensus
with other parties instead. That is why Artous is completely
wrong when he claims that Trotsky's mature formulations
on the party partly return 'to his view of party-consciousness
as formulated in the texts of his youth'.Such
claim might lead to the conclusion that no qualitative
differences exist between a revolutionary proletarian party,
and those centrist -or even reformist- parties, since all
of them would, in principle, help -with their views- the
class to reach its 'common goals', which would turn politics
into a permanent united front.
In Trotsky's view, ‘All sections of
the proletariat, all its layers, occupations and groups
should be drawn into the revolutionary movement’ through
a system of transitional demands put forward by a revolutionary
party, leading the masses towards the seizure of political
power and the inauguration of a regime of soviet democracy.
In doing so, it must put up a political fight against
other tendencies, because ‘In its
social structure, the proletariat is the least heterogeneous
class of capitalist society. Nevertheless, the presence
of such "little strata" as the workers’ aristocracy
and the workers’ bureaucracy is sufficient to give
rise to opportunistic parties, which are converted by
the course of things into one of the weapons of bourgeois
domination.’
The working class must conquer a hegemonic position over
other exploited classes before the seizure of power, because,
as Trotsky points out in History of the Russian Revolution, 'no
historical class has ever switched from oppressed to ruling
layer suddenly, almost overnight, no matter that night
is one of revolution. It is necessary that, right on the
eve of the revolution, it stands in an extraordinarily
independent position with regards to the ruling class;
moreover, the in-between classes and strata, discontent
with the existing order but unable to play an independent
role, should put their hopes in that class.'
And this in turn sends us back to the need of reinstating
the dialectical relationship between the organs of mass
self-determination on one hand, and the revolutionary party
on the other -one which long before the revolution should
strive to boost the tendencies within labour to set up
embryonic forms of dual power, thus laying the basis for
a new workers power.
Epilogue. Once again on 'liberty and liberation'
The crushing of the soviet experience at the hands of
Stalinism and the postwar revolutions, which were mostly
led by bureaucratic (peasant or guerrilla) parties, strengthened
the liberal view postulating that social revolution brought
about some kind of 'liberation', but could never deliver
'liberty'.
In the last few years, after the demise of Stalinism,
another view has come to prevail, one that could be summarily
described as the reverse of the former -i.e., it puts great
emphasis of the other pole of the equation, stating that
'liberty' can materialize regardless of 'liberation'. This
shows through in two distinct strands of contemporary political
theory: 'plural democracy' on one hand, and 'autonomism'
on the other, both of which rule out social emancipation
as a prerequisite for political emancipation, arriving
to the same conclusion through two apparently antagonistic
ways.
Negri, just as a magician would do, likes to imagine the
'immanency' of the political in the social, postulating
that the sphere of politics and the state has somehow ceased
to exist and that the social -the 'multitude'- as an aggregate
of singularities, acts without any mediation at all by
any agency of political representation. Hence, he deems
that the 'soviet' form has been 'outdone' -because democracy
would be a 'direct' one exerted by each singularity in
the multitude, and the 'party' form with it, trumpeting
the achievement of communism without any need of a transition
to it. But since such 'realm of liberty' exists in the
books of Negri alone, and the 'horizontal' push of the
social finds its 'vertical' expression in politics, writing
off a revolutionary agency of workers and the oppressed
altogether ends up in choosing the 'lesser evil' more closely
at hand within the 'really existent' political system -be
it Lula, president Kirchner or someone else.
Laclau's alternative view to autonomist 'immanency' is
one advocating a 'moment of political articulation'. He
argues that 'a purely pluralistic development of the
social which writes off the moment of political articulation,
although it might nourish increasingly deep social fights,
might turn out to be helpless in the long run'.
But for Laclau, such 'articulation' or 'hegemony' relies
on fragmented social subjects, whose contingent and feeble
identities are built outside the relationships of production,
so it can only provide a platform for cross-class 'historical
blocs' or 'progressive' bourgeois governments.
Standing against such resigned views which stop at the
threshold of capitalist property, the working class, in
the last century, showed that a new constituent power lives
within it. Soviets (councils) and a revolutionary party:
these are terms of the equation. A relationship that Trotsky,
in his mature political life, was able to articulate in
a thorough-going programmatic fashion, one that we must
take up for the revolutions in the twenty first century,
so that 'liberation' paves the way to a full exercise of
'liberty', which for us -as for classical Marxism- entails
the advent of a communist society.
'It may be a
truism to say that liberation and freedom are not the
same, that liberation may be the condition of freedom
but by no means leads automatically to it; that the notion
of liberty imlied in liberation can obly be negative,
and hence, that even the intention of liberating is not
identical with the desire for freedom. Arendt H., On
Revolution], Penguin, Great Britain, 1973, p. 29
Building upon the
legacy of the Greek polis, H. Arendt reflects upon the
separation of the political sphere as a distinct space
for public matters, with regards to the private sphere,
as a space for needs, in which both the family and the
economy are included. The Greek citizens who participated
in political life were free men, namely, those who were
not subjected to needs and were thus free from work, which
was carried out by the slaves. Whereas the private –domestic-
sphere was presided over by a natural need of survival
of the individual and the species, the sphere of the polis
was one of liberty. In her book The Human Condition,
she argues that ‘because all human beings are
subject to necessity, they are entitled to violence towards
others; violence is the prepolitical act of liberating
oneself from the necessity of life for the freedom of world’.
Arendt H., The Human Condition, University of
Chicago Press, 1974, p.31.
Arendt H., On Revolution,
p. 65. Toni Negri responds to this fallacious antinomy
typical of liberal theory very accurately, arguing that ‘After
Marx and Lenin it is not possible to talk about political
freedom without any reference to economic freedom, free
production, living labour as political foundations. Liberty
has thus become liberation, with liberation being a constituent
power.’ Negri, A. El poder constituyente. Ensayos
sobre las alternativas de la modernidad [Constituent
Power. Essays on Alternatives to Modernity]
Ed. Libertarias/Prodhufi, Buenos Aires, 1994, p 367
H. Arendt opens
his book On Revolution with the following words: ‘Wars
and revolutions have so far been characteristic of the
physiognomy of the twentieth century. It seems as if the
events have precipitated themselves so as to make the prophecy
anticipated by Lenin come true’. Alianza Editorial,
Buenos Aires, 1992, p 11
Bauman, Z. In
Search of Politics, Polity Press, CambridgeUniversity
Press, 2000. The phrase ‘there is no alternative’ is
attributed to Margaret Thatcher. With his usual sarcasm,
S. Žižek says ‘Nobody seriously considers
pousible alternatives to capitalism any longer, whereas
popular imagination is presented by the visions on the
forthcoming ‘breakdown of nature’, of the
stoppage of all life on earth – it seems easier
to imagine the ‘end of the world’ than a
far more modest change in the mode of production, as
if liberal capitalism is the ‘real’ that
will somehow survive even under conditions of a global
ecological catastrophe’. Mapping Ideology, Verso,
2000, p 1.
These theories should
be put to the test of naked facts one day. For example,
it would be a most fruitful experience to ask Holloway
why the Zapatistas not only have failed to ‘change
the world without taking power’ but also have failed
to reverse the plight of the exploited in Mexico or Chiapas.
Likewise, Laclau should explain why, twenty years after
his book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy was published,
no matter he claims power to be an empty signifier open
to be ‘hegemonized’ by any identity group,
it is always ‘hegemonized’ by the bourgeoise
alone.
‘The question
of the workers party and democracy should be formulated
in the realm of ontology, with reference to an ontology
that has left behind itself all differences separating
the social and the political. To find the political within
the social is not akin to spotting a utopian place; quite
otherwise, this always produces a new definition of the
social (...) In the past, the discourse of emancipation
aimed to an utopian goal in tune with a technique of
piecemeal overdetermination of development, from the
social into the political, until the latter was outdone
and made to come back to the social; nowadays, such discourse,
having gradually become a mystified aggregate deprived
of any measure or hierarchy, founded in a separation
of the social and the political, has worn itself out,
paving the way to acts of liberation’. Negri,
A ‘An Interpretation on the Class Position today:
Methodological Concerns’, included in Guattari,
F.& Negri, A., Las verdades nómadas & General
Intellect, poder constituyente, comunismo [Nomadic
truths & General Intellect, Constituent Power, Communism]
Ed. Akal, Madrid, 1999, ps 112-3
For example, two
of the most prominent theoreticians on democracy such as
C. Castoriadis and C. Lefort come from a Trotskyist background.
They started by criticising the definition of a ‘degenerate
workers’ state’ –and went on to develop
a view of ‘bureaucratic capitalism’ in the
USSR, like Castoriadis. At a later stage, both broke with
Marxism ad became oblivious towards Trotsky’s fight
against Stalin to advance instead a ‘thesis’ which
had become common sense by then –i.e., that the embryo
of Stalinism lay within the Bolshevik Party itself.
‘Agonism’ is
the foundation of plural democracy. The term means a permanent
fight, which unfolds in the political terrain due to the
inevitable nature of antagonisms, but the competing parties
are not ‘enemies’ but ‘agonists’,
because in spite of their antagonism, they both share the
same democratic ethics. Chantal Mouffe is the thinker who
has developed this theory of democracy the most.
The debate revolved
around a series of articles published by Eduard Bernstein
in the journal Die Neue Zeit in 1896-98. In 1899
they were put together by their author into a book titled Die
Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie (The
Foundations of Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy),
which was translated into English in 1909 under the title Evolutionary
Sociaism. At the time when this debate unfolded, Bernstein
had a considerable reputation within the ranks of German
Social Democracy, mainly because he was –along with
Kautsky- one of Engels’ disciples and closest friends.
The debate involved the leaders and most outstanding theoreticians
of the Second International, namely, K. Kautsky. R. Luxemburg.
A. Labriola, Plekhanov and Parvus.
Without showing
the least concern to prove his claims –since the
twentieth century did not endorse Bernstein’s insights-
Laclau just goes on to say: ‘Bernstein clearly understood
that future progress in the democratization of the state
and society would hinge upon the autonomous initiatives
flowing from various spots of the social fabric, since
the increased productivity of labour and the successful
workesrs fights had a combined effect –i.e., the
workers ceased to be «proletarians» and became «citizens» (...)
Bernstein’s view was, no doubt, an excessively simplistic
and optimistic one, but his predictions were fundamentally
right.’ ‘Postmarxismo sin pedido de disculpas’ [‘PostMarxism
without Regrets’], with C. Mouffe, in Nuevas
reflexiones sobre la revolución de nuestro tiempo [New
Reflections on Revolution in our Time], Ediciones
Nueva Visión, Argentina, second edition, 2000, p
143
Bernstein, E. Evolutionary
Socialism. All quotes have been from the electronic
version available at www.marxists.org
The foundations
of that criticism has been laid by Böhm-Bawerk. Bernstein,
as he states in his book, does not make an original critique,
just taking up remarks already developed before. He just
takes the credit for ‘highlighting something that
was not unknown, but has already been said so far.’
The economic laws and tendencies of capitalism charted
by Marx, such as the law of value, have come under fire
almost since their inception.
The post-structuralist thinkers who have undertaken to ‘deconstruct’ Marxism
have not even bothered to study the problems concerning
the law of value. Contenting themselves with the ‘exorbitance
of the political’, they have just decided not to
deal with the tendencies at work within capitalism today,
just buying into the views postulating the ‘end of
labour’. Negri has been the only one to challenge
this tenet of Marxism altogether, seizing upon some facts
that partially contradict the law of value as a pattern
of measure.
For a discussion
on these topics, see ‘Challenging the Misery of Possibilism.
A Trotskyist approach to the prevailing ideas of our time’,
in this magazine.
This reformist
perspective is shared by a whole range of groups: some
local county halls and governments, such as the mayor of
the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre; NGOs, civil groups
and associations such as ATTAC. This strand of people stands
for all sorts of reforms, both on a state level or on the
financial terrain, and they have come to prevail within
the ‘no-global’ –later renamed ‘altermundi’-
movement rallied around the World Social Forum.
He believed in
the ‘civilising’ role of Western capitalism
to the extent of including, in this same book, a chapter
in which he advocates the progressive nature of colonialism,
particularly referring to the benefitial effects of the
colonisation of Morocco.
For Bernstein, ‘due
to the level attained by economic development, there
is more room for ideological and ethical factors concerning
independent activities. The economic evolution loses
part of its power to set the pattern of evolution of
other social tendencies.’ When it comes to
Laclau and post-structuralist theories in general, it
is all about a so-called ‘anti-essentialist’ epistemology,
presided over by contingency, one whose foundations are
to be found in linguistics and the view which postulates
the social as a discourse. For a deeper debate, see ‘The
Sham of Post Marxism’, in Estrategia Internacional Nº 20.
In an article
written by C. Mouffe, Laclau’s disciple, we read: ‘it
is important to distinguish liberal democracy from democratic
capitalism, and to understand it in terms of what classical
political philosophy has called a regime, a political form
of society which plays out exclusively on a political level,
leaving aside its posible articulation with a given economic
system’. Mouffe, Ch.,.The Democratic
Paradox, Verso, London, 2000.
Laclau, E. New
Refelction on the revolution of our Time, Ediciones
Nueva Visión, Argentina, second edition, 2000,
p 144
And he goes on
to say: ‘The ancient Greek society was a slave-holding
democracy. And the same applies, to a certain extent, to
the British, Dutch, French and Belgian democracies. The
United States holds no apparent colonies, but it counts
on Latin America, and the rest of the world is a kind of
colony for the United States, not to mention the fact that
they possess the richest continent and have developed free
from any feudal tradition.’ Trotsky, L. “Discussions
on the Transitional Programme’, Ediciones Crux, p.
157.
This is the name
given to a draft programme submitted for discussion at
a unification congress held in Gotha in 1875 by the Social
Democratic Labour Party and the General Association of
German Workingmen, from which the German Socialist Labour
Party was to emerge. Marx himself harshly cricised the
draft programme which was the embodiment of Lasalle’s
legacy rather than a codifying of revolutionary Marxism.
With regards to the issue of classes, the Gotha Programme
stated that all the social classes were just a reactionary
bloc vis-à-vis the proletariat.
Reference is made
to the law of combined and uneven development in many works
by Laclau, for example in his New Reflections on Revolution
in our Time, he claims that ‘the tendency
to turn structural change into the very axis of political
strategy will be stressed, and will develop a great deal
of its rich potential in Trotsky’s work. For Trotsky,
the very likelihood of revolutionary action itself hinges
upon structural unevenness. Let us examine his permanentistic
perspective in his writings on the 1905 revolution (...)
The structural non correspondance between the proletariat
and the bougeoisie was at the root of the bourgeoisie’s
impossible access to a leading position in the democratic
revolution. The latter would thus be hegemonized by the
proletariat and, in Trotsky’s view, this entailed
the need to go beyond democratic tasks and steer towards
a socialist direction.’ Op cit, ps 63-64
The concept of ‘citizenry’ goes
long back in history. In ancient Greece, the word ‘citizen’ indicated
membership of the polis. According to Aristotle, the citizen
was that who had a right to participate in the political
deliberation of his community. Both strangers and slaves
were explicitly deprived of that right, because only a
man not tied to the need to work could be politically free,
so that citizenry was the political reflection of one’s
socio-economic position.
The theoretical foundations for the concept of citizenry
are to be found in Locke’s liberalism, at a time
when the bourgeoisie was on the rise. He stressed the supremacy
of the individual and property as pre-requisites for the
right to citizenship. Citizenry was thus a fundamental
revolutionary idea for the struggle of the bourgeoisie
against feudalism, calling for an end to the privileges
enjoyed by the nobility and clergymen. One of its most
radical formulations are to be found in J.J. Rousseau’s
denunciation of the ancien regime. The 1789 French
Revolution did away with property as a necessary condition,
declaring all citizens were free from a juridical point
of view, but the first Constitution set out two kinds of
citizens, the active ones, who had a right to vote and
were a minority, and the passive ones, who were disenfranchised.
Under capitalism, citizenship tends to conceal social inequality
behind judicial equality before the state. Political rights
such as universal suffrage became available to all citizens
as a result of hard struggles waged by workers and the
women, who progressively conquered the right to vote, which
eventually became widespread between the early and mid
twentieth century. The main thrust of the bourgeois idea
of 'citizen' is the ultimate separation of the economic
sphere -cut across by the antagonism opposing the capitalist
and workers- from the political sphere, where such antinomy
is blurred and juridical equality presides over all the
inhabitants of a given state, with every single individual
being free to sell or not his labour force. Within the
bourgeois political system, citizenship is an abstract
category concealing the class conflicts tearing society
apart. Of course, it also entails social gains, such as
the right to healtcare provision and public education,
which spread after World War II in the main -which today
are being thrown in reverse. In the main advanced countries,
however, the immigrants are excluded from those basic rights
attached to citizenship.
Bernstein takes
up all the classical topics of liberalism, portraying them
as some kind of scientific truth. As Luxemburg points out: ‘Remaining
true to himself to the very end, he has not only changed
his science, politics, moral and way of thinking, but also
the historical language of the proletariat, by that of
the bourgeoisie. When uses the idea of “citizen” to
refer both to the bourgeois and the proletarian, meaning
with it ordinary men, he puts an equal sign between ordinary
men and the bourgeois, and also human society and bourgeois
society.’ Reforma o revolución [Reform
or Revolution], Selected Works, volume I, ediciones
pluma, Argentina, 1976, p 107
Butler, J.; Laclau,
E; Zizek, S. Contingencia, Hegemonía,
Universalidad. Diálogos contemporáneos
en la izquierda.[Contingency, Hegemony, Universality.
Contemporary Dialogues in the Left] Fondo de Cultura
Económica, first edition, Buenos Aires, 2003, p
316
The Ligue Communiste
Révolutionaire (LCR) is the main section of the
United Secretariat of the Fourth International and one
of the biggest parties claiming allegiance to Trotskyism
in the world.
What came to be
known as 'eurocommunism' was the turn initiated by the
different Communist Parties, mainly those in Italy, France
and Spain -and to a certain extent those in England, Belgium
and Switzerland- back in the 1970s. They dropped the dictatorship
of the proletariat and declared themselves to be independent
from the CP of the Soviet Union, thus codifying into their
program their class collaboration policies. Although it
did not amount to a homogeneous theoretical strand of thought,
by and large it considered that democracy was, in Western
European countries the only way of superseding the rule
of monopolistic capital, and that socialims would be achieved
through democratic means, thus adopting a political stance
very close to that of social democracy, which also advocated
the universal suffrage as a privileged tool for social
change. Etienne Balibar wrote his 'Sur la dictadure du
prolétariat' in 1976, a book in which he takes issue
with the French CP's turn to eurocommunism. He argues against
the claim that the Marxist theory of the state was outlived
because it just took into account its repressive aspects,
among others -claims which are very similar to the ones
advanced today by the LCR's intellectuals.
The LCR argues that
such comparison is a mean-spirited one, because unlike
that carried out by the French CP, the change they made
to their programme does not entail a renunciation to a
fight for 'self-management socialism, a democracy without
limits, the power of workers and female workers too, i.e.,
the overwhelming majority of the population against the
dictatorship of shareholders'.
Among the democratic
demands raised in the Gotha Programme, there was the fight
of the proletariat to build a 'free people's state'. In
Marx view, such undertaking was impossible. In his critique,
he says: 'One might as well ask: what kind of transformation
will the state undergo in a communist society? Or, in other
words, what social functions, similtar to those current
functions of the state, shall linger on then? This question
can only be answered in a scientific fashion, and no matter
we couple together the words people and the word state
a thousand times, we will not get an inch closer to the
solution of the problem. Between capitalist and
communist society there lies the period of the revolutionary
transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding
to this is also a political transition period in which
the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship
of the proletariat.'
Trotsky, L. The
Theory of Permanent Revolution. Compilation, CEIPLT,
Buenos Aires, 2000, ps 40-41
Carr. E. H., History
of the Russian Revolution. The Bolshevik Revolution (1917-1923),
I, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1973, p 169. John
Reed, a key eyewitness to the Russian revolution, gives
the following account of the soviets in that period: 'Never
before had a political organ so sensitive and receptive
to the will of the people been created. This was needed,
because in the revolutionary periods, the will of the
people changes very quickly. For example, during the
first week of December 1917 there were parades and protests
in favor of a Constituent Assembly -i.e., against soviet
power-. An irresponsible Red Guard fired at one of those
demonstrations and many people died. There was an immediate
reaction to such dumb violence. More than a dozen Bolshevik
deputies were called out and replaced by Menshevik ones.
Three weeks elapsed before the mood of the people became
quiet once again, with the Mensheviks being replaced
by the Bolsheviks one by one.' This principle of
recallable representatives presiding over that 'organ
sensitive to the will of the people', reached up to upper
echelons of the soviet state. 'If his leadership
was deemed unsatisfactory, Lenin might be brought down
at any time by a delegation of the masses of the Russian
people, or within the lapse of a few weeks by the Russian
people itself directly'. And once again: 'if
a considerable part of Russia was seriously opposed to
the soviet government, the soviets would not last an
hour'.
Even during the
exceptional period of the civil war, it is interesting
to look into E. H. Carr's research, since he gives a detailed
account on how the Mensheviks and the SRites had been banned
because their policies favoured reaction, but nevertheless
were widely tolerated, regularly publishing their press,
holding congresses and even participating with their own
tickets in the congresses held by the soviets. Replying
to a critique raised by a Bolshevik delegate to 1919 party
congress who opposed the lifting of the ban on both Mensheviks
and SRites, Lenin said: 'We are often required to change
our line of conduct and this might seem strange and hard
to understand to a superficial observer. «What is
this?» he'd day. «Yesterday, you made promises
to the petty bourgeoisie and today Dzerzhinski states that
both the Mensheviks and the SRites have to be sent before
a firing squad. What a contradiction!» Yes, this
is a contradiction, but there is also a contradiction in
the behaviour of this very same petty bourgeois democracy
that does not know where to place itself, it tries to sit
down in two seats at the same time, jumping from one to
the other, being now on the left and then on the right...To
this we reply: «you are no serious enemy; our serious
enemy is the bourgeoisie. But if you should side with it
we would have to enforce on you the measures of the proletarian
dictatorship too.» Carr, E. H., op cit, p 191
Et la dictadure
du prolétariat?, Rouge 2040, 20/11/2003.
As post Marxists would do, the LCR has started to veer
to a position that hints that the soviet regime led by
the Bolshevik Party was the same as Stalinism. In the above
quoted article, F. Ollivier says: 'In the name of the
revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, conceived
as an exceptional regime in exceptional circumstances,
Lenin, Trotsky and many other leading Bolsheviks brought
in measures that progressively smothered soviet democracy
within the recently-born revolutionary organizations. We
see a substitution of soviet democracy by the rule of the
party, a curtailed power of councils and committees, a
rejection to convene another Constituent Assembly, after
a ban on tendencies inside the Bolshevik Party itself was
imposed. The dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia,
even between 1918 and 1924, resulted in a merger between
the state and the party, as well as the suppression of
all democratic liberties.' Likewise, A. Artous in
his comments on O. Besancenot's book says that the latter
has a 'critical view of the first years of the 1917
Russian Revolution, although «Trotskyists» usually
highlight the sharp contrast between those years and the
USSR under Stalin'. And he adds: 'there are two approaches
on the causes leading to a bureaucratisation of the revolution:
one of them -a classical one, as it were- stresses the
whole range of «objective» conditions (the
civil war, a ravaged country) to account for the problems
to be dealt with, arguing that the behaviour of the Bolshevik
leadership was essentially pragmatic. The other approach
highlights instead the effects of «subjective» conditions:
the emergence of authoritarian practices and theories on
power among the Bolsheviks themselves. The book takes sides,
quite correctly, with the second approach' . La révolution
c'est la démocratie jusqu'au bout..., Critique
Communiste Nº 169-170, p 42
O. Besancenot
is the new public figure of the LCR. He stood as a candidate
for the 2002 presidential election.
In 1977, the United
Secretariat published a resolution under the title 'Socialist
democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat', in
which they stood for soviet democracy and a multiparty
system. However, this did not prevent them from adapting
themselves to all strands of the bureaucracy, such as the
Castroite regime or else the Sandinistas. Later on, they
had expectations in the 'democratic' credentials of Gorbachev's
glanost.
La révolution
c'est la démocratie jusqu'au bout..., Critique
Communiste Nº 169-170. In the same issue of the
magazine I. Joshua claims that both Marx and Engels had
a rather fragmented view of the bourgeois state, whereas
Lenin 'only stressed its repressive aspect' enshrined within
Engels' definition on the state. Hence, Lenin advocated
a special power of proletarian repression -which would
sitll bear a repressive nature no matter it was in the
hand of the population at large- to counter that special
power of bourgeois repression. It goes without a saying
that this is a biased interpretation of Lenin's State
and Revolution, since Joshua overlooks the radical
democratic programme put forward by Lenin there as a means
for organising the state. Its repressive nature has to
do with the fact being a state as such, it entails a class
rule, but a rule that is exerted exclusively against the
bourgeoisie and the autocracy. If we look back at the definitions,
Joshua argues that the State is the 'bourgeoisie's agency
of political hegemony over society, of class aliances'.
It is true that since the times of Lenin and Trotsky, the
bourgeoisie has improved its state apparatus and oiled
the mechanisms to reach consensus, but bourgeois rule does
not amount to hegemonic rule alone -the latter is combined
to various degrees with a resort to the repressive forces.
As in the times of Marx or Lenin, it remains the last resort
in case the citadel of bourgeois power is threatened.
With regards to universal suffrage or referendums, Joshua
claims that 'the forms of self-organization, the foundations
for a new political power, can be totally gutted out (...)
with public functions critalising in permanent institutions
and organs'; so permanent forms should be created 'to
make room for an upheaval from «below» in the
shape of a referendum or popular initiatives.'
'Correctly
understood, any project of a radical democracy incorporates
a socialist dimension, because it is necessary to put
an end to the capitalist relationships of production
that are at the root of the various bondage links; but
socialism is one of the components of a radical democracy
and not the other way around.'Laclau, E. & Mouffe,
C. Hegemonía y estrategia socialista. Hacia
una radicalización de la democracia [Hegemony
and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democracy]
Fondo de Cultura Económica de Argentina, second
edition, Buenos Aires, 2004, p 224. Let us note, in passing,
that back in 1985 Laclau still resorted to concepts such
as 'socialism' or 'capitalist relatioships of production',
which have completely vanished from his theoretical perspective
ever since.
Arendt, H. Crisis
de la república [The Republic in Crisis]
Taurus, 1999, p 232. Similar views can be found in other
texts, such On Revolution, where the examples
go back to the anti-Stalinist revolutions like the 1956
upheaval in Hungary. H. Arendt thinks that there is an
insurmountable contradiction between the democratic expression
of councils, on one hand-of all the non partisan masses-
and revolutionary parties, on the other. This leads her
to a simplistic view on the degeneration of the USSR,
since she ends up blaming the Bolshevik Party and even
Lenin himself for it. However, H. Arendt just applied
the term 'totalitarianism' to both the Nazi and Stalinist
regimes, defining the first few years of the Russian
Revolution as opposed to totalitarianism -she branded
it a 'Bolshevik revolutionary dictatorship'. But in H.
Arendt’s view, the revolutionary dictatorship (both
those of the Bolsheviks and the Jacobines alike) relies
upon an ‘intensification of the revolutionary movement’.
The paradox –in her view- lied in the fact that
this sort of ‘permanent revolution’ could
only stand in place on condition that the ‘dictatorship’ was
maintained –since the revolutionaries either refused
themselves or were prevented from putting an end to the
revolution and inaugurating a constitutional government,
thus achieving their goals. In spite of her avowedly ‘anti-Leninist’ approach,
her insights have come under fire from a whole array
of academics and theoreticians of liberal democracy,
who tend to think that her appraisal of totalitarianism,
confined to Stalinism and Nazism, ‘provides a rationale
for regimes such as the soviet one under Lenin.’
If we were to
adopt the ‘democratic’ criteria advocated by
the LCR, we should, for example, regard the derailment
of the Nicaraguan revolution -never mind it did not usher
in a workers’ state- through general elections as
a legitimate procedure. And this in spite of the fact that
the Frente Sandinista handed power into the hands of the
pro-American president Violeta Chamorro.
L. Trotsky, La
revolución traicionada [The Revolution
Betrayed], Ed. Crux, p 230
It is very striking
indeed that both the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) and
the PO (Partido Obrero) hardly mention the soviets as a
concrete form of organising the dictatorship of the proletariat
in the polemic articles with the LCR’s positions.
The MAS by and large refuses to raise democratic demands
such as the Constituent Assembly in semicolonial countries
-never mind it is a lever to help the masses go beyond
their democratic illusions and demands and also usher in
organs of self-determination. However, when it deals with
the transitional period, it turns away from those demands
that should deepen workers' democracy, standing instead
for 'combined' demands -like the LCR does- such as universal
suffrage, completely cut off from any class organ or perspective,
so that they basically end up glossing over the dictatorship
of the proletariat as well. The Partido Obrero, for its
part, comes to a similar conclusion, repeating hollow truisms
in a very 'orthodox' fashion. The PO's blueprint for a
transitional society seems closer to a bureaucratic dictatorship,
rather than a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.
In a lengthy document drafted by Jorge Altamira, main PO
leader, under the title 'Programmatic Theses of the Fourth
International', workers councils are just mentioned in
passing in section 1 of the 25th paragraph, which deals
with some general guidelines the 'Fourth International'
would advance with a view to a political revolution in
Cuba. Quite surprisingly, no mention is made of such organs
-which Trotsky himself deemed 'the embyonic forms of the
new proletarian state'- in the section dealing with 'The
Question of Power, the Party and the International'. This
article authored by Jorge Altamira has been published in
their journal In Defence of Marxism Nº 33.
The MAS critique of the LCR has been published in their
journal Socialism or Barbarianism of April 2004,
under the title "The Idea of 'dictatorship of the
proletariat', the French LCR and the Argentine PO. Socialist
Revolution, Democracy and Dictatorship", written by
Isidoro Cruz Bernal. If a reader looks through the electronic
version of this article, he will find out, by using the
search engine, that the idea of 'soviet' appears just twice
in this lengthy text -and when it does, it is in those
quotes taken from the LCR texts.
Bensaid D. Le
sourire du Spectre. Nouvel esprit du communisme,
Editions Michalon, France, 2003., p 197. It is worth
reading the whole article La démocratie à venir,
so as to get a complete picture of the LCR's views on
democracy.
Artous, A. Marx,
l'Etat et la politique, Editions Syllepse, France,
1999, p 536
Artous, A. Travail
et émancipation sociale. Marx et le travail,
Editions Syllepse, France, 2003
Artous claims that
Soviet etatisme, by keeping the producers separated
from the means of production, on top of the continued existance
of the division between manual and intellectual labour,
fostered a distinct sphere of production, which tended
to reproduce, by means of bureaucratic command, the capitalist
despotism reigning in the factories. Although the LCR has
never officially espoused a bureaucratic collectivistic
view of the USSR, standing by Trotsky's classical definition
of a degenerated workers state, Artous seems to be drifting
towards that position. In his book, he takes issue with
the idea of a degenerated workers state still in place
after the victorious Stalinist counter-revolution. And
he goes on to say that both Trotsky and Lenin neglected
the effects of despotism in the workplace within a transitional
society, which would tend to reproduce itself, just as
Marx had envisaged vis-à-vis capitalist society.
Precisely because
of that he quotes in his book M. Weber's notorious 'premonition'
in 1917 on the Russian Revolution and the tendencies to
bureaucratization that he himself observed in the evolution
of capitalism. Weber considered that a piecemeal elimination
of private capitalism was possible, at least in theory.
However, this would not lead to the elimination of the
anti-human 'iron cage' of industrial work, with private
enterprise managers being replaced by a state bureaucracy
-which would n turn rule free of any constraints. In Weber's
view, the continued existence of a private bureaucracy
allowed, to a certain extent, a mutual control with the
state bureaucracy. But the withering away of private capitalism
would bring about a single state bureaucracy, which would
usher in a tougher rule.
Trotsky, op cit
p 243
With regards to
the 1918 Constitution, Carr writes: 'The Declaration
of the Working and Exploited People was not a chart of
rights in the traditional sense, but a proclamation of
an economic and social policy', and thus it did not recognize
'any formal equality of rights. There was no such tradition
in Russian constitutional record, because the subjects
of the czar were divided into five legally established «hierarchies»,
with each of them enjoying a distinct legal status.' These
were the nobility, the clergy, merchants, petty bougeoisie
(shop-keepers, craftmen, employees) and peasants. The urban
proletariat did not have any legal status. 'Those distinctions
were abolished, and a single legal category of citizen
was introduced.' The declaration also proclaimed that 'Attending
to the general interest of the working class, the RSFSR
deprives all individuals or distinct groups of any privileges
they might resort to use them for the detriment of the
socialist revolution.' Carr, E. op cit, ps 159-160
Artous, A. op cit
p 188
This view on a transition
from class in itself to class for itself as the advent
of class consciousness was also developed by Luckacs strand
of Western Marxism.
Karl Marx, ‘Manifesto
of the Communist Party’, in The Revolutions of
the 1948, Penguin 1973, p.79
In the last few
years, an attempt has been made to 'reclaim' Lenin as a
political strategist by those currents on the left of the
postmodern spectrum, by underlining the autonomy of the
political and how he seized upon a strategic moment, along
the lines of A. Badiou's theory of denouement.
Lenin, V.I.. 'Our
Tasks and the Soviet of Workers Deputies' (Letter to the
Editorial Board).
The incorrect
position held by Trotsky in his youth drew him closer to
the 'party as a class agency' view. His stance for a reconciliation
between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks also led him to oppose
Lenin very sharply, since he considered the latter's view
on the party as substitute to make up for the self-activity
of the proletariat. But Trotsky overcome those flawed views,
eventually agreeing with Lenin on the link to be established
between the soviets on one side, and the party on the other
-which would lead him to join the Bolshevik Party on the
eve of the October Revolution.
Trotsky, L. op
cit, p. 234
Trotsky, L. op
cit, p. 235
Trotsky, L. The
Transitional Programme
Artous, A. op
cit, p 317
Artous, A. op
cit, p 380
Trotsky, L. op
cit, p 235
Trotsky, L. History
of the Russian Revolution, Sarpe, Madrid, 1985,
volumen I, p 177
Excerpt taken
from a verbatim record of a lecture delivered by Ernesto
Laclau in the School of Social Science, July 15 2003. Available
at www.fsoc.uba.ar |